Séminaires LEMMA

Mardi 14 mai 2019, 11 heures, salle Maurice Desplas

"The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement"

Abstract :

Collective choice mechanisms are used by groups to reach decisions in the presence of diverging preferences. But can the employed mechanism affect the degree of post-decision actual agreement (i.e. preference homogeneity) within a group? And if yes, which are the features of the choice mechanisms that matter? Since it is difficult to address these questions in natural settings, we employ a theory-driven experiment where, after the group collectively decides on an issue, individual preferences can be properly elicited. We find that the use of procedures that promote apparent consensus with an outcome (i.e. agreement in manifest behaviors) generate substantially higher levels of actual agreement compared to outcome-wise identical mechanisms that push subjects to exaggerate their differences.

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Un poste de Maître de conférences en mathématiques appliquées est ouvert au Lemma.
Pour plus d'informations, contacter Antoine Billot, directeur : antoine.billot@u-paris2.fr

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