Mardi 19 novembre 2019 - 11 heures - Salle Maurice Desplas
"Forclesure Auctions"
Andras NIDERMAYER - Université de Cergy-Pontoise et THEMA(en collaboration avec Artyom Shneyerov et Pai Xu)
Abstract: We develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special feature that the lender acts as a seller for low prices and as a buyer for high prices. The theory yields several empirically testable predictions in relation to the strategic behavior of agents when the lender has a private signal about the quality of the property. Using novel data from Palm Beach County (FL, US), we find evidence that the lender has a private signal about quality. Asymmetric information is found to be relevant in the two applications of our theory we investigate: mortgage securitization and integrated lenders.
