Séminaires LEMMA

"Does comprehensive compulsory school equalize opportunities? Evidence from the Swedish schooling reform"

Arnaud LEFRANC (CYU)
Mardi 12 mars 2024, 11h-12h

Lemma - 4 rue Blaise Desgoffe, 75006 Paris. Salle Maurice Desplas

Abstract : This paper analyses the long-run distributional effects of the increase of compulsory schooling implemented in Sweden after WWII. To assess the extent of inequality of opportunity, we focus on the distribution of labor market earnings, conditional on father's education. According to equality of opportunity theories, any gap in the distribution of earnings attributable to differences in family background should be interpreted as inequality of opportunity. The reform is said to equalize opportunities if it reduces the gaps in the conditional income distribution, across different levels of parental education. We assess the effect of the reform using estimates of the quantile treatment effects of the reform conditional on family background. Our identification exploits the quasi-experimental implementation of the reform. Our results first indicate significant inequality of opportunity for earnings acquisition among post-WWII Swedish cohorts. Second, while the educational expansion policy had virtually no effect on the average level of earnings of treated individuals, it allowed to significantly equalize opportunities by closing the gap in the opportunity profile of children of low vs. high education parents.


"Discrete choice under oaths"

Nicolas JACQUEMET (PSE - PARIS 1)
Mardi 5 mars 2024, 11h-12h

Lemma - 4 rue Blaise Desgoffe, 75006 Paris. Salle Maurice Desplas

Abstract : The Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) remains by far the most popular mechanism used to elicit preferences for non-market goods and services. Yet, the actual reliability of DCE still is questionable. Using an induced value experimental design, we show that standard benchmarks achieve no better than 56 to 60% of payoff-maximizing choices. In this paper, we assess whether a truth-telling oath implemented before the DCE improves the reliability of elicited preferences. Three key findings emerge. First, having respondents voluntarily sign a a truth-telling oath achieves a 50% improvement in payoff-maximizing choices. According to response times data, this is achieved thanks to increased cognitive effort. The induced- value design allow us to directly measure attribute non-attendance. Using this measure, we show this increased cognitive effort induces a significant decrease in attribute non-attendance under oath. Second, based on structural utility models, we show the usual welfare measures inferred from DCE responses are unbiased if and only if respondents were first exposed to the truth-telling oath. Third, we show that the type of oath matters to improved DCE decision making—the commitment to honesty via the truth-telling oath improves choices, whereas an oath to task or an oath to duty did not improve choices.