Séminaires LEMMA


"Sender-receiver game with receiver commitment and restricted number of messages"

Maël Le Treust (CNRS - Cergy)

(Joint with Tristan Tomala)

Mardi 1er février 2022 - 11 h / 12 h
Lemma - 4 rue Blaise Desgoffe, 75006 Paris. Salle Maurice Desplas

Abstract :
We investigate a long-run sender-receiver game in which the receiver commits to a strategy. A sequence of state is generated i.i.d. and processed by the sender which has less available messages than states. Before the game is played, the receiver commits to a strategy that assigns a sequence of actions to each possible messages from the sender. When the length of the sequences of states and actions increases, we provide lower and upper bounds on the receiver optimal utility by taking into account the incentive constraints of the sender.
Séance également accessible sur Zoom. Lien envoyé mardi 1er février, avant le séminaire.
Participants extérieurs : écrire à nicolas.fremeaux@u-paris2.fr


"Gender and Lawmaking in Times of Quotas"

Quentin Lippmann (Paris Panthéon-Assas Université - Cred)

Mardi 25 janvier 2022 - 11 h / 12 h
Lemma - 4 rue Blaise Desgoffe, 75006 Paris. Salle Maurice Desplas

Abstract :
This article studies gender differences in lawmaking in a context of gender quotas. I use two empirical strategies to randomize the gender of legislators and text analysis to identify the topics of the legislation in the French Parliament from 2001 to 2017. Across the two Houses, I find consistent evidence that female legislators work on different topics than men. I show that they are most active on women's issues while men seem more involved in military issues. I provide evidence that these differences partly stem from legislators' individual interest. From a public policy perspective, the results suggest that gender quotas are likely to lead to a shift in lawmaking and a greater prevalence of women's issues in Parliament.

Séance également accessible sur Zoom. Lien envoyé mardi 25 janvier, avant le séminaire.
Participants extérieurs : écrire à nicolas.fremeaux@u-paris2.fr


"Equality without mobility? New estimates of intergenerational income mobility in France"

Clément Dherbecourt (France Stratégie)

Mardi 11 janvier 2022 - 11 h / 12 h
Lemma - 4 rue Blaise Desgoffe, 75006 Paris. Salle Maurice Desplas

Abstract :
This paper presents new measures of intergenerational income mobility in France built on the French “Permanent Demographic Sample” (EDP). It is the first paper based on the direct, i.e. non-imputed, measure of income observed in French administrative data. The first contribution of the paper is to provide traditional estimates of intergenerational mobility: intergenerational elasticity, rank-rank slope, transition matrix. In the baseline estimation, I find an intergenerational elasticity (IGE) of .30 and a rank-rank slope (RRS) of .29. These new estimates are significantly lower than those based on imputed parental income. The paper also presents quintile-quintile and quartile-quartile transition matrix. I complement these measures with the average income gap between children from fifth and first quintile of origin (“Q5Q1 income gap”). The second contribution of the paper is to compare income mobility levels in France, the United States and Denmark. Considering the IGE and RRS presented in Chetty et al. (2014), France is slightly more mobile than the United States and significantly less mobile than Denmark. Using mobility matrices and the WID’s incomes distribution, I find aQ5Q1 income gap of 260% in the US, to 180% and 130% in Denmark. About three quarters of the difference between France and the US is due to France’s lower inequality of income. Almost all of the difference between Denmark and France comes from a difference in rank-rank mobility, since income inequality is about the same in the two countries. I provide evidence that differential access to education is an explanation of France’s low income rank mobility. Using EDP data on generations born in the 1990s, I find a link between parental income and tertiary education as high as in Chetty et al. (2020) for the United States.


"VOTING BY SIMULTANEOUS VETOES"

Matias Nunez (CREST)

Mardi 7 décembre 2021 - 11 h / 12 h
Lemma - 4 rue Blaise Desgoffe, 75006 Paris. Salle Maurice Desplas

Abstract :
We propose the first class of non-dictatorial voting mechanisms that induce coalitional implementation, that is, double implementation in both Nash and coalition-proof equilibria. Assuming that preferences over alternatives are strict and that preferences over lotteries satisfy stochastic dominance, we prove that each such mechanism implements a subset of the Pareto correspondence that ensures each voter a minimal level of satisfaction. In these mechanisms, vetoes and off-equilibrium lotteries are used to reach coalitional implementation while each equilibrium is deterministic. We then discuss necessary conditions for arbitrary mechanisms to coalitionally implement a Pareto efficient rule. We show that coalitional implementation is strongly related to the presence of veto rights in the mechanism.

Joint with M. Kirneva


Séminaire - Groupe de travail Théorie économique


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