Séminaires LEMMA

"Incentive compatible information disclosure"

MASAKI AOYAGI (Osaka University)

Mardi 16 septembre 2025, 11h-12h

Lemma - 4 rue Blaise Desgoffe, 75006 Paris. Salle Maurice Desplas

Masaki is Professor at the Osaka University He is a leading scholar in game theory, specializing in repeated games and mechanism design. In recent years, he has also conducted research on experiments in games and decision-making under uncertainty. He is also co-editor at the International Economic Review.

Abstract : This paper studies the optimal disclosure of information about the quality of an agent when his type has two components.  The first component is privately observed by the agent, but the second component is latent.  The latent component is discovered by a principal when the agent participates in a screening mechanism by reporting the first component.  The principal then discloses Information about the agent's type to the market/public, which rewards the agent with compensation equal to his expected quality.  We say that a disclosure rule is Implementable when it induces truth-telling from the agent with appropriate adjustment in transfer and identify conditions under which full disclosure is implementable.   When full disclosure is not implementable, we study implementability by expressing it in terms of linear inequalities of the mean conditional posteriors given the agent's type.  When the principal's objective is the minimization of the mismatch between the true and expected qualities, we show that the optimal disclosure rule is a solution to a convex problem in terms of the mean conditional posteriors and show when the number of pooling messages under the optimal disclosure rule can be related to the number of the linear inequalities expressing implementability.

"Information Aggregation by Council"

NIKOLAS TSAKAS (University of Cyprus) with Dimitrios Xefteris

Mardi 10 juin 2025, 11h-12h

Lemma - 4 rue Blaise Desgoffe, 75006 Paris. Salle Maurice Desplas