Auction Theory - Mechanism Design - Public Economics - Microeconomic Theory
Publications
Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence, with Francisco Gomez-Martinez, Sander Onderstal and Tom Truyts, accepted at Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Auctions with Signaling Concerns, with Tom Truyts, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2021.
Effets de réputation dans les enchères : l'inégalité des perdants, with Tom Truyts, Revue Economique, 2021.
Charitable Asymmetric Bidders, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2020.
Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets, with M. Ranger, Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2018.
Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction, with B. Roussillon and P. Schweinzer, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2016.
Charity Auctions for the Happy Few, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016.
All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards, with M. Ranger, Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2014.
Wars of Attrition and All-Pay Auctions with Stochastic Competition, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2012.
How Lotteries Outperform Auctions, Economics Letters, 2011.
L'enchère à offres payantes. Un mécanisme aux applications diverses, Revue Economique, 2011.