Théorie des jeux répétés, coopération, réputation, apprentissage.
Publications
Observation delays and cycles (with Sidartha Gordon and Lucie Ménager) (2021), Games and Economic Behaviors.
Strategic observation with exponential bandits (with Lucie Ménager) (2021), Journal of Economic Theory.
Self-Isolation (with Dominique Baril-Tremblay and Lucie Ménager) (2021) Journal of Mathmatical Economics, vol.93.
Reputation in stochastic games with two long lived players, (2021) Economic Theory, 71(1), 1-31.
Perturbed finitely repeated games, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 98, p. 39-46.
A folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon, Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 58, no. 3. Reputation Effects in a Hold-Up Problem, Revue économique, 2011, 62(3), 557-565.