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Breaking negative narratives: Long-term Social Progress and Trust in Institutions

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Breaking negative narratives: Long-term Social Progress and Trust in Institutions *

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Abstract

Democratic institutions worldwide are facing rising distrust. We posit that establishing data-driven narratives on long-term social progress and holding institutions accountable for it can restore confidence in institutions. We focus on public safety, a domain in which progress can be quantified by declining violence across industrialized countries. We implement a large-scale online experiment in Italy, a country particularly prone to negative narratives, exposing 7,000 adults to data-driven narratives on declining homicide rates, justice efficiency, and corruption reduction in the last twenty years. The information significantly increases social and institutional trust, including incentivised donations to a law enforcement–related organization (effects of 6–9% of a standard deviation). These findings persist fifty days later in a follow-up survey. Effects are strongest when social progress is explicitly linked to state action and for individuals holding more negative views. Both positive news and accountability dynamics drive the results. These findings offer a pathway to counter persistent disillusionment in democratic governance, by showing how aligning public perceptions with societal progress can restore institutional trust.

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1 Introduction

"When people wrongly believe that nothing is improving, they may conclude that nothing we have tried so far is working and lose confidence in measures that actually work. I meet many such people, who tell me they have lost all hope for humanity."

– Hans Rosling

Trust in democratic institutions has eroded in recent decades.[1] According to OECD data, only 39% of citizens trust their national governments, a share that has steadily declined over the past two decades and is even lower in many non-OECD countries.[2] Events like corruption scandals (Daniele, Aassve, and Le Moglie, 2023; Rivera, Seira, and Jha, 2024) or the mismanagement of a crisis (Algan, Guriev, Papaioannou, and Passari, 2017; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022) are some (valid) triggers of the erosion of trust. They formalize an institutional failure and represent an opportunity to reflect on its negative performance.

At the same time, the past few decades have seen remarkable progress across a wide range of social and economic indicators across the world: notable examples include substantial reductions in child mortality and extreme poverty, expanded access to education (especially for girls), and significant increase in life expectancy.[3] All those positive trends would have arguably been difficult to achieve without institutional efforts.

Such social progress suffers from both a lack of public awareness and problems of attribution (Rosling, Rosling, and Rönnlund, 2018). Because these improvements tend to unfold slowly and gradually, they lack the newsworthy appeal of sudden negative events, which also cater to the preference of audiences for negative information (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs, 2001; Robertson, Pröllochs, Schwarzenegger, Pärnamets, Van Bavel, and Feuerriegel, 2023; Rozin and Royzman, 2001; Soroka, Fournier, and Nir,

[1] Across OECD countries, recent surveys show growing disillusion toward political institutions, with trust and distrust now roughly evenly split. Within the European Union, overall trends point to growing distrust. In the United States, trust in government has seen a particularly steep decline. According to the Pew Research Center, the proportion of Americans who say they trust the federal government to do what is right "just about always" or "most of the time" has dropped from 75% in 1958 to just 20% in 2022.
https://www.oecd.org/governance/trust-in-government/
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/news/news-articles/trust-in-institutions-continues-to-fall-in-eu-despite-declining-unemployment-and-phasing-out-of
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/06/06/public-trust-in-government-1958-2022/

[2] OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results

[3] Since 2000, the global under-five mortality rate has declined by 52%: UNICEF: Levels and Trends in Child Mortality. Between 1990 and 2015, the extreme poverty rate fell from nearly 36% to 10%, declining by about one percentage point per year: World Bank: Decline of Global Extreme Poverty Continues but Has Slowed. Access to education has expanded significantly, especially for girls, promoting gender equality and long-term development: World Bank: Gender Equality–Education and Skills. Global life expectancy increased by more than six years between 2000 and 2019, rising from 66.8 to 73.1 years: World Health Organization: GHE–Life Expectancy and Healthy Life Expectancy.

2019). At the same time, attributing long-term social progress to a specific institution or political actor is inherently difficult, as such outcomes typically result from complex and diffuse efforts accumulated over time.

In this paper, we ask whether trust in institutions can be restored by breaking the negative narrative about long-term social and institutional progress. We define a *narrative* as the summary of a change in the reality and we refer to it as *negative* when *negative trends* are overrepresented. We design our intervention as a *positive narrative*, intentionally highlighting social progress. To test the importance of institutional accountability, we induce variation in three ways: i. reference to *general* versus national institution; ii. mentioning (versus omitting) the *link* between improvements and institutional efforts; iii. referring to *positive trends* with *indirect* versus *direct* connection to institutional efforts. We conduct a large-scale information-based experiment focused on public safety, a domain that has seen substantial improvements in most industrialized countries: between 1990 and 2018, the homicides rate declined by 46% in both North America and Western Europe, making these societies considerably safer than a generation ago.[4] We thus test whether exposure to positive, data-driven narratives about public safety and institutional accountability can alter entrenched negative perceptions of the state. To do so, we collected data from a representative sample of 7,000 Italian adults, each randomly assigned to one experimental condition (as described below).[5]

We empirically study this question in Italy for two reasons. On the one hand, Italians often have low confidence in state institutions.[6] The average skepticism of the Italian population about the ability and quality of their institutions constitute a particularly tough test for soft interventions aiming to tackle such a deeply rooted negative narrative. On the other hand, despite narratives of inefficiency, corruption, and slow-moving justice, Italy has undergone a remarkable transformation in terms of public safety and institutional performance over the past few decades. It thus constitutes an ideal case for examining long-term positive social change. In the 1990s, the country faced one of the highest homicide rates in Europe. Yet by 2022, it had achieved the lowest homicide rate in the European Union and now ranks seventh among the safest countries in the world in terms of homicide rates (UNODC, 2023).[7] Homicides fell dramatically from a peak of 1,916 in 1991

[4]Estimates based on UNODC: Homicide Rate Data.

[5]We slightly oversample from Southern regions, where trust in state institutions tends to be especially low.

[6]In 2023, 36% of Italians reported high or moderately high trust in the national government according to OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2024 Results - Country Notes: Italy. In our sample, only 15% of respondents report a trust level above 5 (on a scale from 1 to 10) for national politicians, and just 35% do so for the justice system.

[7]Among the current 27 EU member states, Italy had the second-highest murder rate in 1990, surpassed only by Romania.

to 322 in 2022, a decline of more than 80%. At the same time, institutional performance advanced significantly: homicide clearance rates more than doubled, rising from 40% to over 80%. The efficiency of the justice system also improved: the share of civil trials resolved within one year increased from 11% to 24% over the past decade.[8] In parallel, reforms contributed to reducing institutional corruption – Transparency International reports that Italy improved its global ranking by 28 positions over the last 20 years.[9] These positive trends are, at least in part, the result of major institutional reforms and sustained efforts by law enforcement to combat serious crimes.

Similar to other forms of social progress, these positive developments are largely overlooked, and Italians continue to view their institutions as underperforming. Media outlets frequently highlight violent episodes, particularly homicides, which capture public attention and might reinforce perceptions of widespread violence (Mastrorocco and Minale, 2018). On the contrary, progress in areas like justice and corruption is rarely highlighted or discussed. This negative focus can distort public understanding of actual trends. To illustrate with a concrete example, a recent study by Campedelli, Daniele, Martinangeli, and Pinotti (2023) found that about two-thirds of Italians believe that murders have increased, rather than decreased, in the last 20 years: a striking mismatch between perceptions and reality.[10]

Empirically, we design a *positive narrative* intervention that we unpack into four experimental arms where we vary the level of institutional accountability. Our first experimental condition (T1 - *general indirect trends*) introduces respondents to information about the steady decline in homicide rates across Europe over the past two decades, offering a general, non-country-specific account of societal progress. With *indirect trends* we refer to steady changes in society wide outcomes reflecting underlying social progress, but which cannot be directly attributed to institutional actors' efforts to achieve social progress. The second intervention (T2 - *indirect trends*) presents the same statistical trend but it focuses specifically on Italy, enabling us to isolate the impact of national framing. The third intervention (T3 - *link and indirect trends*) directly credits the Italian state for its efforts to improve public safety, thereby attributing progress to institutional action, without yet providing evidence of its direct impact. The fourth intervention (T4 - *link and all trends*)

[8]Data on homicides, clearance rates, and the performance of the civil justice system is based on data provided by ISTAT (Italian National Institute of Statistics) in its official publications.

[9]Based on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranks countries by perceived levels of public sector corruption. See: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi. Italy moved from the 69th in 2011 to the 41st position in 2022.

[10]Misperceptions on crime data are common across countries: For instance Esberg and Mummolo (2018) show crime misperception in the US as largely a byproduct of the frequency and manner of encounters with relevant facts.

strengthens the attribution of institutional responsibility by including trends that can be directly attributed to state performance. These *direct* trends include increased clearance rates, shorter civil trial durations, and lower corruption levels. Summarizing the purpose of our experimental interventions, we move from a general, non country specific (within the European context) and non-institutionally driven portrayal of social progress (T1), to an Italian focused (T2), institutionally fuelled (T3), directly attributable (T4) one.

We compare our four interventions to two different baseline groups. The first one (C0) presents only a general message about the role of the justice system and law enforcement but without any *positive narrative* content. This message is shown in all experimental conditions to ensure a constant baseline reference to institutional functions. This way, we isolate the effects of *positive narrative* by holding institutional reference constant. The second control group (C1) is designed to account for potential "positive news" effects. It presents a positive societal trend unrelated – or less directly related – to institutional performance. Specifically, we rely on the sharp decline in the suicide rate in Italy over the past two decades. Alike the decline in homicides, the reduction in suicide rates follows a sustained trajectory, but it is arguably less attributable to direct state intervention.[11]

Our first set of results is descriptive. At baseline, we find widespread misperceptions about both *indirect* and *direct trends* in public safety among Italian respondents. On average, individuals believe that homicide rates in Italy have increased by 24% over the past 20 years. Respondents also tend to underestimate improvements in performances more directly related to institutional efforts, such as the justice system, perceiving trial durations as having worsened. Views on corruption and homicide clearance rates are slightly more optimistic but still fall well short of actual progress. These distorted beliefs confirm the starting point of our experiment: a large gap exists between public perception and institutional performance, particularly in domains central to public safety and justice.

Investigating our interventions against C0, we find that exposure to positive, data-driven information about institutional performance significantly increases trust in state institutions, including the police, the justice system, as well as in politicians and fellow citizens. Treated individuals also show a higher willingness to donate to an institutional nonprofit organization supporting law enforcement, and a greater likelihood of stating they would call the police if victimized by a crime. The effects range from 6 to 9% of a standard deviation and are stronger for T4 (which includes the complete set of good news related to public safety) and for T1 (which relates to violent crime reduction in the entire European Union).

[11]The suicide rate in Italy decreased by almost 50% in the last twenty years: Istituto superiore di sanità - data 1987 – 2016; Istituto superiore di sanità - data 2019.

We also find that our experimental effects are particularly strong among individuals who initially held more negative views about public safety, i.e. those who believed that homicide rates and other key indicators had deteriorated in recent years. This heterogeneity aligns with the idea that informational interventions are most effective when there is a larger gap between perceptions and reality.

When comparing our main interventions with c1, we find that the positive effects on trust are no longer significant for general institutional outcomes, but remain present for dimensions more directly connected to public safety, such as trust in police and courts. This evidence suggests that the effects observed in our primary interventions are driven by two related mechanisms: a general "good news" effect, and a more targeted accountability effect tied to perceptions of institutional efficacy. To confirm this interpretation, we collected additional data asking respondents to attribute responsibility for improvements in the indicators presented. As expected, improvements in homicide rates, clearance rates, corruption and trial durations were more strongly attributed to the state than the decline in suicide rates.

Two common limitations of information-based experiments on survey scale are (i.) the short life-span of the effects observed, and (ii.) demand effects (Zizzo, 2010). We implement four design strategies to address these concerns: i. we obfuscate the purpose of the study. ii. We elicit an incentivised measure of institutional trust, consisting in the allocation of a fixed monetary amount between the respondent and a governmental organization accepting private donations in support of law enforcement.[12] iii. We elicit our outcome (institutional trust) in a domain (inflation expectations) unrelated to the institutions addressed by our interventions (justice and law enforcement). iv. We field an obfuscated follow-up approximately fifty days after the first and main survey. These design strategies are discussed in detail in Section 3.

The follow-up (with a take-up rate of about 50%) was deliberately designed as a short, unrelated questionnaire focusing on lifestyle habits, contact with public services, and everyday interactions with Italian institutions. Respondents did not know that the follow-up survey was part of the same study, minimizing the risk of biased responses due to recall or experimenter demand.[13] We find that the core effects persist almost two months later across all outcomes, with similar magnitude, suggesting that this simple information

[12]The ONAOMAC, further described in what follows, supports the families of law enforcement officers who lost their lives in the line of duty.

[13]To reduce the likelihood that respondents would associate it with the original survey, we also radically altered the user interface, framing, and language of the follow-up. We find no evidence of selective attrition based on prior beliefs or other observable characteristics, which reduces concerns that our effects are driven by self-selection into the follow-up.

intervention can have lasting effects.[14]

In the follow-up survey, we also re-assess factual knowledge by asking at the very end of the questionnaire (to avoid demand effects) about trends in homicides and other public safety indicators. We find that respondents in the treated groups are significantly more likely to answer these questions correctly, in line with improvements of factual understanding of long-term institutional progress.

1.1 Related literature

This paper primarily contributes to our knowledge on how to rebuild trust in institutions. To the best our knowledge, it is the first one to focus on the long term societal progress. While prior studies have focused on the causes and consequences of trust erosion (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Daniele and Geys, 2015; Daniele et al., 2023; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008; Martinangeli, Povitkina, Jagers, and Rothstein, 2024; Rivera et al., 2024; Tabellini, 2008), there is surprisingly little evidence of how trust can be rebuilt. A few notable exceptions focused on targeted state interventions or policy implementations. Acemoglu, Cheema, Khwaja, and Robinson (2020) improved trust in Pakistani courts by providing information about a successful judicial reform that reduced pending cases. Khan, Nasim, Shaukat, and Stegmann (2021) found less encouraging results in the same context when informing respondents about the government's success in managing a dengue epidemic. Abril, Norza, Perez-Vincent, Tobón, and Weintraub (2023) retrained police officers and found improved public trust and willingness to pay for police services. Briscese and Grignani (2024) study the US during COVID-19 and find that politically motivated heuristics shape evaluations of government performance, while easier access to institution-sourced information boosts trust and compliance.

Unlike targeted interventions tied to a specific policy area or crisis, we focus on broad, long-term social progress, like the decline in violent crime. Our approach centers on structural progress that unfolds gradually and may escape public attention due to media bias (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005), cognitive shortcuts (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin and Royzman, 2001), or limited information (Soroka, 2006). We show that communicating these overlooked improvements can change perceptions and rebuild trust, highlighting the potential of *credible* informational interventions grounded in long-term structural progress. Moreover, we provide evidence not only of short-term attitudinal change, but also of its persistence fifty days after our interventions. Finally, we

[14]Note however that data for our C1 baseline was collected after the follow-up study. We therefore cannot use it to investigate responses in the follow-up study.

show that informational interventions are particularly effective among those who initially hold overly negative beliefs, in line with the importance of correcting misperceptions as a pathway to belief change.

Second, our work contributes to the literature on institutional accountability. Economists have primarily examined political accountability, both theoretically (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Persson and Tabellini, 2004; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988) and empirically, with a focus on elections as the main accountability mechanism (Besley and Case, 1995; Besley and Prat, 2006; Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011; List and Sturm, 2006; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Snyder Jr and Strömberg, 2010). More recently, attention has expanded to informal forms of accountability, exercised by citizens, the media (Besley, Burgess, and Prat, 2002; Larreguy, Marshall, and Snyder Jr, 2020; Vaccari, 2023), and civil society organizations (Dunning, Grossman, Humphreys, Hyde, McIntosh, Nellis, Adida, Arias, Bicalho, Boas, et al., 2019), which scrutinize political behaviours outside formal electoral and uses reputation for sanctioning (Behn, 2001; Bovens, 2010). A smaller strand of research examines institutional accountability, where public institutions monitor and constrain one another (Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin, 2008; Maskin and Tirole, 2004; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini, 1997).

We depart from this literature by focusing on accountability mechanisms based on reputation (trust)[15]. To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate how social progress linked to institutional accountability shapes citizens' trust in democratic institutions.

Finally, our work connects to a recent and growing literature on misperceptions, which has primarily examined their impact on policy preferences and voting behaviour (Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva, 2023; Gennaioli and Tabellini, 2023; Nyhan, 2020; Stantcheva, 2024; Windsteiger, 2022). For example, Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) documented misperception about intergenerational mobility trends in various Western democracies and show that more pessimistic information increases support for redistribution. Further, research in psychology found that U.S. workers overestimate organizational racial progress in executive representation and suggest that misperception might drive beliefs about inclusion policies (Torrez, Hollie, Richeson, and Kraus, 2024). On the other hand, Većkalov, Geiger, Bartoš, White, Rutjens, van Harreveld, Stablum, Akın, Aldoh, Bai, et al. (2024) find that correcting misinformation about climate reduce misperception and increases worry, but do not translate into a change in policy preferences. Finally, Mosleh, Yang,

[15]A widely used classification of accountability uses the direction of power flow: vertical accountability runs bottom-up, as citizens hold politicians to account through elections and public pressure; horizontal accountability runs side-to-side, as state institutions (e.g., courts, legislatures, audit offices) oversee and constrain each other; and diagonal accountability runs bottom-up-through-institutions, when citizens and civil society activate oversight bodies or the media to enforce checks. See O'Donnell (1998), Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000), and Bovens (2010).

Zaman, Pennycook, and Rand (2024) document that when misinformation correlates with partisanship positions, policies that are ex-ante politically neutral can lead to partisan asymmetries in treatment. Our work departs from the focus on policy preferences and partisanship. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first one to examine misperceptions about state performance – independent of specific policy choices or partisan alignments – yet highly consequential for trust in institutions.

2 Motivating framework

As noted above, public debates on long-term social, economic, and institutional performance are often shaped by widespread misperceptions, with negative assessments persisting even in the face of improvements. To motivate our intervention, we propose a simple framework linking trends, narratives, and trust, highlighting how narratives – while intended to summarize reality – can create a harmful gap between the information individuals receive and the actual state of the world.

We define the true changes of reality as *trends*. For the purpose of our analysis, trends are either positive or negative: an improvement in institutional performance is a *positive trend*, while deterioration is *negative trend*.

Further, we define a *narrative* as a summary of trends. When the distribution of reported trends mirrors reality (e.g., 50% positive in both reality and narrative), no distortion arises. A discrepancy occurs when the narrative underrepresents positive or negative trends (e.g., 50% positive trends but 10% of the narrative is positive), thereby generating a gap between reality and reported information.

Negative narratives can emerge for several reasons. We do not provide here a comprehensive account of why certain trends are ignored or underemphasized, but some well-documented mechanisms are compatible with our framework (see Rosling et al. (2018) for a review). Negative events tend to be more newsworthy than gradual positive trends, leading media coverage to skew toward bad news (Soroka, 2006). The economic literature suggests that selective omission becomes a form of media slanting that cannot always be corrected by increasing competition in the market for news (Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)). Moreover, psychology and evolutionary theory suggest a built-in negativity bias in human attention and memory, whereby negative information is more salient and influential than positive information (Baumeister et al., 2001; Robertson et al., 2023; Rozin and Royzman, 2001; Soroka et al., 2019). Regardless of the cause, negative narratives are unlikely to generate counterbalancing dynamics. Hence, without external intervention, they are most likely going to persist.

Under perfect information, individuals observe institutional performance directly and update their level of trust from trends. Under asymmetric information individuals instead rely on the narrative rather than the underlying trends.

Accountability refers to the obligation of institutions to explain and justify their actions and performances, under mechanisms that allow other institutions or the public to evaluate and, if necessary, sanction them. In our set-up, sanction and reward take the form of reputation (trust). Positive and negative narratives differ significantly in their relationship to accountability. Negative trends often culminate in scandals, which are discrete, newsworthy events that make it easy to identify and hold specific individuals or institutions accountable (Khan et al., 2021; Rivera et al., 2024). The public and media can point to a clear cause and effect, demanding consequences for those responsible. In contrast, positive trends, such as long-term social progress, are often the result of complex and diffused efforts over time, involving numerous contributors. Because they lack a single climactic event, it is far more difficult to attribute success to a specific institution or policy and, consequently, to hold anyone accountable for them.

Trust in institutions is thus shaped by the narratives through which individuals interpret the social and economic patterns they observe, many of which are directly or indirectly linked to institutional performance. When these patterns are persistently distorted towards failure, decline, or dysfunction, while improvements remain overlooked, individuals may come to perceive institutions as ineffective or irrelevant.

We conceptualize our experiment as a policy intervention in contexts of low institutional trust. The intervention seeks to realign perceptions by countering negative narratives with an accurate, positive account of long-term social progress. In practice, this account is conveyed through a set of verifiable trends, varying in their degree of connection to institutional action, thereby providing individuals with credible information that might offset the distortions induced by the negative narratives.

A final important aspect concerns whether the information conveyed to individuals is actually perceived as credible. Credibility is a crucial factor that underpins our entire experimental design, as we implicitly assume that participants consider the information provided to be trustworthy. This assumption is far from trivial given the low-trust environment in which we operate and the recent decline in confidence toward academic institutions (Soliman, 2024). Further, Hoes, Aitken, Zhang, Gackowski, and Wojcieszak (2024) documented that policies that aim at reducing misinformation might increase scepticism over information. To address this, we asked respondents whether they found the information presented in the videos to be credible. 77% of treated respondents reported that they considered the information reliable, in line with a high self-reported level of

credibility.

3 Survey and Methodology

Data collection and sample We conducted a large-scale survey on around 7000 individuals in Italy between February and May 2025.[16] We targeted residents between 18 and 65 years of age, representative of the Italian population along the age, gender, region of residence and education dimensions. We oversampled from the South of Italy while maintaining representativeness along the other dimensions (local geographic representativeness within northern and southern regions is preserved). The link to the Qualtrics survey was distributed by *Demetra*, a commercial survey company (https://www.demetra.com/en/). Participating respondents received a participation payment upon full completion. Median completion time was 12 minutes in the main survey sample. We implemented a follow-up survey, on average 50 days after the initial wave, with a take-up rate of about 50%.[17]

3.1 The survey

We here describe the structure of the survey, mentioning and discussing the fielded items and questions in the order of elicitation.[18]

Demographics and Obfuscation 1. We started by collecting information about gender, age group, province of residence, marital status, household size and income group. We then ask about political partisanship and voting behavior. To mitigate the demand effect, we asked individuals about their information-seeking behavior – specifically, which platforms they use to find news and how frequently they engage in this activity. We discuss the demand effect extensively in section 3.3.

Priors. We elicited individuals' perception about social progress on four dimensions: i. percentage change in the number of homicides over the past 20 years; ii. change in the share of homicides solved with identification of the perpetrator over the past 20 years; iii. change in the position of Italy in the ranking of countries by level of corruption over the past 20 years; iv. change in the percentage of civil legal disputes closed within a year of

[16] This sample size allows us to detect a minimum effect MDE=0.11 standard deviations over pairwise experimental condition comparisons (1200 observations per branch) of standardised outcomes, at power p=0.8 and $\alpha = 0.05$.

[17] The follow-up study assumed a re-contact response rate of 60% (3600 individuals), orthogonal to the experimental variation. We thus obtain an MDE=0.14 standard deviations, at power p=0.8 and $\alpha = 0.05$.

[18] The full survey in Italian is in the Online Appendix D.

their opening over the past decade. We include in the question an explanation of how to interpret positive and negative changes to avoid confusion. For example:

> *How do you think the number of murders committed in Italy has changed in percentage terms over the last 20 years? Positive values: more murders compared to the past. Negative values: fewer murders compared to the past. Use the slider to tell us how much you think the number of murders has changed, in percentage. The slider will appear when you click on the bar.*

The respondents used a slider to indicate their belief. The slider consisted of a visible slider bar which did not display a slider handle upon landing on the page. The slider handle would appear upon the subject clicking on the bar, on the exact spot where the respondent had clicked. We implemented this design to avoid anchoring effects. Moreover, while moving a slider, the respondents saw in real time what answer the slider's current position would imply. For instance, when the slider indicated -50% [+50%] text, invisible before the appearance of the slider handle, would read:

> *Murders declined [increased] by 50% over the past two decades*.

The number visualised in the text and the corresponding descriptive word change color from purple to blue when switching from negative to positive values. When the slider was placed on 0% the text would display *no change* in black.[19] Note that we are unconcerned with whether the respondents are correct in their beliefs, the elicitation of which only serves the purpose of gauging their ex-ante perceptions.

Information Videos. Each respondent was randomly assigned to one of six information videos, each one corresponding to one of our experimental interventions (C0, C1, T1-4). The links to the youtube videos can be found in Online Appendix B. We describe these interventions and their a priori effects in Section 3.4. Table C2 in Appendix C shows that the randomization is balanced with respect to a set of individuals' characteristics.

Inflation and Obfuscation 2. As part of our strategy to prevent demand effects (Zizzo, 2010), we introduce a methodological innovation consisting in shifting the focus from the institutional domain targeted by our intervention to another, unrelated one. This way, we both limit demand effects and gain an insight into whether intervening on individuals' perceptions of institutional performance, beyond increasing trust within the domain

[19]This display strategy is common to all sliders used in this study and its description will be henceforth omitted in the interest of space.

of interest, also spills over on trust in unrelated institutions. Specifically, we used the respondents' inflation expectations as a measure of their trust in the public institutions. We rely on the assumption that while inflation is determined by exogenous forces, its management remains under institutional responsibility. This approach allows us to evaluate the impact of our interventions on institutional trust without directly addressing trust in domains linked to our information interventions (i.e. justice and the judiciary). The conceptual distance between the target of our intervention (judiciary performance) and the domain within which trust is elicited (inflation management) limits demand effects. This strategy is further and more in detail discussed in Section 3.3.[20] Because this question is less sensitive to demand effects, we placed it right after the information conditions, further distancing the latter from more sensitive outcomes.

Further, we add four questions about online information consumption as further obfuscation before fielding our outcomes of interest. [21]

Donation. We next fielded an incentivised measure of individuals' support for the state's efforts in fighting crime. Each respondent was endowed with 1 Euro, which they could split in one-cent increments between themselves and the ONAOMAC (Opera Nazionale Assistenza Orfani Militari Arma Carabinieri), a non-profit institutional organisation supporting families of law enforcement officers who died in the line of duty.[22] The donation was made by moving a slider, and respondents saw in real time the amount given to ONAOMAC and the remaining amount for themselves. A button allowed them to read more about ONAOMAC (Appendix A).

Reporting a Crime. Following a set of four obfuscation questions on media preferences, we elicited a self-reported outcome consisting of a composite measure of: (i) willingness to take action to resolve minor disputes and, conditional on such willingness, (ii) reliance on institutional channels rather than on alternative non-state social networks. The aim was to capture choices when facing the trade-off between institutional law enforcement

[20] Specifically, respondents were asked: "Average consumer prices vary over time. Would you please tell us to what extent you think prices will vary between now and the end of the year?" The answer was provided using a slider ranging from –10% to +10%.

[21] In particular we asked individuals to which extent they agreed/disagreed with the following statements: i. "The era of print magazines is over; they should make way for online periodicals"; ii. "The era of televisions is over, they should make way for online broadcasts"; iii. "What do you think is the biggest obstacle to the spread of online periodicals?"; iv. "What do you think is the biggest obstacle to the spread of online broadcasts?".

[22] The question read: "We are now endowing you with 1 Euro. This is a new euro, and your choice will not impact previous decisions. You can decide how many cents to donate to ONAOMAC; whatever you choose not to donate, you will receive along with your participation compensation."

and informal network-based justice channels. To minimise strong demand and desirability effects, we adopted a two-step elicitation that avoids explicitly presenting controversial response options while leaving them as an implicit choice.[23]

Trust We also collected direct self-reported measures of institutional trust through the following question: "On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means 'None' and 10 means 'A lot,' how much trust do you place in [Institution]?" The institutions—presented in random order—were national politicians, regional politicians, municipal politicians, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, and the public administration. Responses were summarised in two aggregate indices (one for trust in politicians and one for trust in justice and law enforcement) by summing up the values of the single underlying variables we elicited. In addition, we collected a measure of generalised social trust[24].

Additional Variables. We also collected data on respondents' outlook for the future of their region.[25]. We then asked: "On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means 'Not at all' and 10 means 'Completely,' how much do you think public institutions implement policies that are beneficial in the long term?" Finally, respondents assessed the ethical implications of relying on personal networks to obtain justice after minor crimes: "On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means 'Not problematic' and 10 means 'Very problematic,' how ethically problematic do you consider using personal connections for justice after crimes such as theft, robbery, or assault?" This measure captures the perceived ethical boundaries of resorting to informal or criminal networks. We conclude our survey with additional question on demographics, such as education, occupation, previous region of residence and born in Italy. We then ask to guess the aim of the survey, whether the information we shared could be considered trustworthy and a free form to motivate their last answer.[26]

[23]Respondents were first told: "Imagine that you, someone you know, or a member of your family have been the victim of a crime (e.g., theft of a personal item such as a motorcycle or car, or a robbery on the street involving threat or force). How would you act in response to this situation?" Possible responses were "I wouldn't do anything" or "I would seek help to obtain an appropriate resolution or compensation for what happened." Those who selected the latter were then asked: "Staying with the previous case, you mentioned that you would seek help in resolving the matter. On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means 'Never' and 10 means 'Always,' how likely are you to turn to law enforcement and the appropriate judicial authorities?"

[24]This was measured using the World Values Survey question (Inglehart, Haerpfer, Moreno, Welzel, Kizilova, Diez-Medrano, Lagos, Norris, and Puranen, 2014): "In general, do you think that most people can be trusted, or that one can never be too careful when dealing with others? Please answer on a scale from 1 (you need to be careful) to 10 (most people can be trusted)."

[25]"Tell us whether you feel very pessimistic, somewhat pessimistic, somewhat optimistic, or very optimistic about the future of [your region]". The order of these categories was randomised both in the question text and in the response list.

[26]Notice that we also collect the participants' risk aversion and time preferences using the method described in Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde (2018). We find no effect of our interventions on these

3.2 Follow-up survey

To gauge the persistence of our effects, we recontacted respondents fifty days later, on average. We did so through the survey company to preserve anonymity. The full transcription of the follow-up survey in Italian can be found in Appendix E. This second wave was framed as a study on lifestyle habits and public service usage, employed a radically different interface and language to further reduce linkage with the first wave.

After demographic and obfuscation questions, we measured trust in institutions using reworded items. Respondents rated: "Agreement with: 'Italian institutions prioritise citizens' interests in their actions' (1 = Not at all, 10 = Entirely)." They then indicated: "Satisfaction with the overall quality of Italian institutions" (1 = Totally dissatisfied, 10 = Totally satisfied). Next, they were asked: "Has the overall quality of Italian institutions changed over time?" with options—presented in random order—ranging from "Yes, for much worse" to "Yes, for much better," including "No, they haven't changed." Those indicating change were further asked: "Over what period has this change occurred?" with possible responses: the past 2–3 years; the past 10 years; the past 20 years; since the 1980s or earlier; or since at least the end of the 20th century. Finally, respondents answered the same institutional trust battery as in the block "trust" of the main study.

3.3 Demand effect and data quality

A common limitations of experiments are demand effect: in this case, a respondent receiving information about improvements in the quality of justice and enforcement institutions might offer responses in alignment with what they infer is the objective of the study to questions that they can easily trace back to the information they received (e.g. trust in the judiciary). We discuss here four strategies we adopted to tackle this concern.

First, we obfuscate the study as a survey on news preferences and consumption. The obfuscation questions encapsulate the information conditions within a coherent framework justifying their presence in the respondents' mind and distracting them from the true objective of the study.

Second, we introduce an incentivised measure of support for justice and law enforcement institutions. This way, we capture underlying preferences to support the institutions in an incentive compatible framework.

Third, we elicit institutional trust within a domain which does not explicitly refer to nor directly recall the information provided as part of our conditions. In particular, we elicit the respondents' expectation about an economic phenomenon which, while to

mesasures, which we hence do not report.

a large extent under institutional control, is unrelated to the specific institutions upon which our interventions are built (justice and the judiciary). To do so, we elicit the respondents' expectations about future inflation. While institutional control over inflation is not perfect, it remains sensitive to political intervention. Beliefs about it thus reflect individual perceptions of institutional quality (ability to control it) for given exogenous economic and geopolitical circumstances (Christelis, Georgarakos, Jappelli, and van Rooij, 2020; Niizeki, 2023). Notably, the exogenous factors determining both inflation and inflation expectations are orthogonal to randomised experimental variation and plausibly fixed over the short time period during which the study was fielded. Any systematic variation in inflation beliefs captured by our experimental conditions will thus indicate how individuals' perceptions of institutional ability were exogenously shifted by our intervention. The fact that the institutional sphere is different across intervention and outcome has a double advantage: first, it constitutes a particularly hard test bed for the mechanism under study, and second, any effect suggests the presence of spillovers across institutional domains.

Fourth, and perhaps more importantly, we fielded an obfuscated follow-up study in which re-contacted IDs participated fifty days, on average, after their participation in the first wave. Participants in the follow up were not aware of filling a survey related to the baseline. Moreover, the follow up was obfuscated as well: we hid questions about institutional trust within a larger survey about lifestyle habits, contact with the public'and with the institutions. The follow-up study platform also changed the language and the look and feel of the survey, to minimise the chances that a respondent might link the two studies.

Finally, to ensure highest data quality, we reminded to the respondents that skipping questions or answering with inattention might cause loss of their compensation. In our final sample, the survey is almost entirely completed. For example, our main outcomes variables on trust have only 0.16% missing values. Further, almost 60% of the respondents completed the free form at the end of survey with direct reference to the videos or questions in the survey.

3.4 Experimental design

We now describe the experimental design that allows us to study the effect of the *positive narrative on institutions-driven social improvements* on institutional trust. As anticipated in section 2, we define a *positive narrative* as a summary of a change in the reality that oversamples *positive trends*. We intentionally construct our interventions to study the elements constituting a *positive narrative*, by leveraging *positive trends* observed in the

domain of public safety.

We are particularly interested in institutional accountability, a feature that makes positive and negative narratives substantially different. Our investigation proceeds in three steps. First, we vary the institutional framework of reference by building narratives mentioning *European* trends, the effects of which we contrast to narratives mentioning analogous *Italian* ones. Second, while these first two interventions omit the *link* between institutional effort to provide public safety, our third intervention explicitly refers to the institutional investments to improve security and protection. Third, the first three interventions rely on a trend of unclear attribution to institutional effort (an *indirect trend*), i.e. the decrease in murder rates observed in Italy (and elsewhere; see below) over the past two decades: our fourth intervention adds (*direct*) trends that are an explicit outcome of institutional investment.[27]

By design, all our conditions include positive news. While the *positive* tone is part of the *narrative* we want to test, it is only one part of it. To disentangle whether effects are driven by exposure to positive news versus our arguments of positive trends and institutional accountability, we design a second control group exposing the participants to positive news less likely to be linked to institutional performance. We present the six conditions in details below.[28]

Co - Control. Our main control group fixes any baseline effect of mentioning the institutions against which we evaluate the effects of the experimental conditions. Respondents are exposed to the following message:

> *"Justice plays a fundamental role. It ensures the application of laws and the respect of individual rights. Law enforcement agencies and the judiciary have the task of keeping society safe."*

This message is also part of all the interventions T1-T4.

T1 - General Indirect Trend. The respondents receive information about the steady decline in homicide rates, a *positive indirect trend*, across Europe over the past two decades. The decrease in murder rates in Italy is part of a broader social transformation undergone by most European countries. T1 therefore provides statistics about a *general* non-country specific trend in societal progress. Not mentioning the Italian institutions allows us to

[27] Dropping murder rates cannot be attributed directly (only) to Italian justice and enforcement. Rather, their decline is expression of broader cultural and social shifts reaching beyond the Italian institutional context (Tonry, 2014).

[28] The links to the videos are in the Online Appendix B.

evaluate the effect of providing analogous information about declining murder rates but within the Italian context in T2. With respect to C0, we add the following:

> *"Did you know that in Europe the murder rate* has decreased significantly in the last 20 years? (*number of murders with respect to the total population) Murders have decreased by about 70%. For every ten murders in 2000, today there are only 3."*

T2 - Indirect Trend. T2 provides the respondents with the same *positive trend* about murder rates provided in T1, but focused on Italy. The Italian decline in murders matches a general trend experienced in most other European countries, allowing us to keep wording and estimates provided constant across the two experimental conditions (the text presented in T1 changes only in the word "Italy" replacing the word "Europe"). This condition reveals any additional effect of mentioning the Italian institutions in the context of information about social progress to an Italian public.

T3 - Link & Indirect Trend. We here add the *link* between institutional efforts and self-improvement. With respect to T2, we add the following:

> *"The Italian state invests substantial resources each year in the field of security and protection."*

This condition preserves the social progress sentiment and establishes a story of active involvement of the institutions in social progress. Namely, we emphasize that the Italian state invests large amounts of public resources to guarantee public safety. Condition T3, therefore, investigates whether exposure to the *link* between institutional effort and positive performance is sufficient to elicit perceptual and behavioural change, and delegates the investigation of the combined effects of the *link* and *all trends* together to T4.

T4 - Link & All Trends. T4 adds the *direct trends* to T3. These trends, contrary to murder rates, are fully and directly linked to institutional action: increased clearance rates, reduced civil trial duration and reduced corruption.[29] This condition therefore tests the effect on individual trust of a *positive narrative* build on supporting strong facts and explicit link with institutional effort to achieve improvements. To ensure comparability with T3, we also include the same statistics about decreased murder rates.

[29] More precisely: i. in the past 20 years there has been a 30% increase in the number of homicides solved in Italy; ii. in the past 20 years, Italy climbed 28 positions in the ranking of less corrupted countries in the past 20 years; iii. in the last decade, there has been a 100% increase in the number of civil trials that are solved within one year.

C1 - Positive News. The respondents are exposed to information about a steady decline in suicides in Italy. This information is loaded with social progress sentiment, but omits both mention and implicit links to the institutions and institutional action. This intervention allows us to weaken the connection between social improvement and the institutions, reference to which is fully omitted.

4 Perception of long-term social progress

Figure 1: Perception of long-term social progress.



NOTES: The red triangles report the real change. The dark blue circles report the mean of respondents' priors. In light blue the confidence intervals of the mean. The distance between the red triangles and the blue dots represents the average misperception in our sample. **A.** Change in the number of homicides in the last 20 years: real change of −70% versus a mean of +23%. **B.** Change in the number of homicides solved in the past 20 years: real change of +30% versus a mean of +17%. **C.** Change in the corruption ranking in the past 20 years: real increase of 28 positions versus a a mean of 4 positions increase. **D.** Change in the number of civil trials that are solved within one year in the last decade: real change of +100% versus a mean of −6%.

We present here our first set of results. Our intervention is motivated by the erosion of trust in democratic institutions. We posit that *negative narratives* summarize the reality by overlooking negative facts. If this is true, we should observe a negative misperception about social progress. Hence, we start by surveying individuals' perception about social

progress linked to institutional performance along four dimensions: change in the number of homicides in the last 20 years, change in the number of homicides solved in the past 20 years, change of Italy's position in the corruption ranking in the past 20 years, and change in the number of civil trials that are solved within one year in the last decade. In line with our hypothesis, we find negative misperception along all dimensions.

Figure 1 plots the real change in four dimensions of the state performances (red triangles) and the mean of the respondents' beliefs about the very same performance (dark blue circles). The change in number of homicides and the speed of civil trials display the higher mismatch between real change, −70% and +100%, and the mean of priors, +23% and −6% respectively. The change in the number of homicides solved and position of Italy in the corruption ranking show milder but still negative misperception (real change of +30% versus a mean of +17%, and real increase of 28 positions versus a mean of 4 positions increase). The full distribution of priors is displayed in figure C1 in Appendix C.

National averages can mask variation at the local level, both in terms of priors and in terms of social progress. Figure C2 in the appendix plots the variation in the change of number of homicides at regional level as well as respondents' prior. Crucially, priors remain clustered around the national mean while heterogeneity of the real value is more substantial. This suggests that individual perception of homicides is more related to a national narrative rather than local experience. Figures C3-C5 shows a similar pattern for priors about change in homicides solved, corruption ranking and civil trial speed.

5 Positive narrative and accountability

We now provide an empirical answer to our research question: can trust in institutions be restored by breaking negative narratives and enhancing accountability? This section presents our *positive narrative* intervention, unpacked in several experimental arms varying the degree of institutional accountability. Overall, our intervention is successful at increasing trust in institutions, both in the short and medium term.

Specification In our main specifications, we sum trust in the police and judicial system to obtain *trust state*. Similarly, we sum individual trust in national, regional and municipal politicians to obtain *trust politicians*. All our baseline specifications include a set of control variables (gender, age, income, highschool dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly) and cluster standard errors at the provincial level. The outcome variables are standardized against the mean and standard deviation of the control group. The unstandardised mean and standard deviation of the control group, conveying information

Table 1: Positive narrative and accountability.

	(1) trust state	(2) trust admin	(3) trust polit	(4) social trust	(5) donation	(6) inflation perception	(7) useful policies	(8) ask help	(9) call police
PANEL A									
T1-T4	0.072**	0.010	0.051*	0.079***	0.093***	-0.049	0.040	-0.002	0.048*
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.029)
	[0.059*]	[0.926]	[0.343]	[0.041**]	[0.043**]	[0.389]	[0.463]	[0.909]	[0.441]
PANEL B									
T1	0.102***	0.032	0.095***	0.093***	0.127***	-0.020	0.081**	0.017	0.055
	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)
T2	0.066*	0.016	0.025	0.064*	0.058	-0.051	0.028	-0.040	0.062*
	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.036)
T3	0.026	-0.026	0.007	0.048	0.088**	-0.010	0.014	-0.003	0.020
	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.037)
T4	0.094**	0.019	0.078**	0.115***	0.100**	-0.118***	0.035	0.018	0.056
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.038)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	5,567
R^2	0.060	0.034	0.054	0.047	0.025	0.022	0.020	0.024	0.074
Mean Co	12.01	4.814	11.56	4.336	42.49	4.536	4.705	0.923	8.384
SD Co	4.143	2.276	6.438	2.385	35.37	3.586	2.196	0.267	2.038

NOTES: This table reports the effects of the *positive narrative* treatments versus the control group Co - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions - on the variables in the columns. Panel A shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see 3.4). Panel B shows the effect of each treatment separately. Outcome variables: (1) *trust state* is the sum of individuals' trust in the police and judicial system; (2) trust in public administration; (3) *trust politicians* is the sum of individuals' trust in national, regional and municipal politicians; (4) *social trust* is trust in others; (5) *donation* is the amount individuals choose to donate to ONAOMAC; (6) *inflation* expectations; (7) *useful policies* captures the belief that public institutions will implement policies that are beneficial in the long term; (8) *ask help* is the willingness to take action to resolve minor disputes; (9) *call police* capture the reliance on institutional channels rather than on alternative non-state social networks (conditional on *ask help*). All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes with respect to the sample mean (mean and standard deviation of the dependent variables of the control group are reported at the end of the table). Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. Robust p-values corrected for multiple hypotheses based on Theorem 3.1 in List, Shaikh, and Xu (2019) are reported in square brackets.* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

about baseline attitudes across the general population, are reported at the bottom of the table. All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation with respect to the sample mean.

Main Results Table 1 reports the main experimental effects of receiving a *positive narrative* information conditions (T1–T4) versus the control group Co - baseline effect of mentioning

the institutions - on a wide set of outcomes. Panel A shows the pooled effects of being exposed to a *positive narrative*. The pooled effects on trust are positive, ranging from 5% to 8% of a standard deviation. The intervention also has an overall positive effect on incentivized outcomes, with 9% increase for donation and 5% increase of calling the police in case of need.[30] We report in square brackets robust p-values corrected for multiple hypotheses (List et al., 2019).

In panel B we unpack the *positive narrative* effect by varying the degree of institutional accountability. With T1 we aim at exposing respondents to true positive trend in a general institutional setting, that is by abstracting from the Italian context. We do so by referring to a positive change (decrease in number of homicides) at the European level. We do not mention institutional effort. T1 generates strong positive effects on both trust outcomes (between 9% and 10%) and action (about 13% effect on donation). With T2 we investigate the impact of exposing individuals to true positive performance of the Italian institutions. We find milder effects on trust and action (about 6%), which suggests a lower impact for less general framing. With T3 we investigate the effect of a *positive narrative* emphasizing the *link* between institutional effort and performance, resulting only in an increased donation in support of law enforcement. T4 tests the effects of stressing both the link between institutional effort and performance, while adding *direct trends*. Results are comparable with those obtained by T1. T4 is also the only case in which we find a clear effect on the inflation outcome, in line with the strength of this specific treatment.[31] Recall that this outcome is a particularly hard testing ground for our intervention due to the conceptual distance we create between our intervention and the outcome, each targeting a different sphere of institutional intervention: justice and monetary policy. The result on inflation expectations therefore reassures us that the findings on justice and law enforcement institutions are not driven by demand effects.

[30] Note that we depart from the pre-analysis plan in our empirical strategy for these outcomes. We had in fact planned a bivariate model jointly investigating the probability of taking action following victimisation (a binary variable), and of pursuing institutional channels conditional on this choice. Because more than 92% of our sample states willingness to take action, this strategy cannot be pursued. We thus report OLS models of the likelihood of taking action via institutional channels and, for the sake of completeness, of taking action.

[31] Table C3 reports the findings for each separate trust outcome as well as for the additional relevant outcomes included in the survey.

Table 2: Follow-up.

	(1) trust state	(2) trust admin	(3) trust polit	(4) trust EU	(5) hom ITA	(6) hom EU	(7) hom solved	(8) corrupt	(9) speed trials
PANEL A									
T1-T4	0.085**	0.078*	0.076*	0.081**	-0.084*	-0.063*	0.008	0.066	0.096**
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.042)
PANEL B									
T1	0.075	0.087*	0.077	0.047	-0.059	-0.022	-0.009	0.048	0.097*
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.049)
T2	0.118**	0.088	0.080	0.133**	-0.093*	-0.070	0.022	0.062	0.081
	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.059)
T3	0.089*	0.068	0.064	0.079*	-0.080	-0.056	0.007	0.052	0.066
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.071)	(0.057)
T4	0.055	0.069	0.083	0.063	-0.104**	-0.107**	0.013	0.104*	0.145***
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.053)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	3,091	3,091	3,091	3,091	3,091	3,091	3,091	3,091	3,091
R^2	0.072	0.048	0.057	0.064	0.043	0.030	0.017	0.017	0.034
Mean Co	10.70	4.372	11.52	4.326	19.48	16.80	16.81	3.047	-1.776
SD Co	4.308	2.297	6.473	2.548	37.52	36.04	35.19	43.66	40.45

NOTES: This table reports the effects of the positive narrative treatments versus the control group Co - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions - on the variables in the columns 50 days, on average, after our main intervention. Panel A shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see 3.4). Panel B shows the effect of each treatment separately. Outcome variables: (1) *trust state* is the sum of individuals' trust in the police and judicial system; (2) trust in public administration; (3) *trust politicians* is the sum of individuals' trust in national, regional and municipal politicians; (4) trust in European institutions; (5) expected change in the number of homicides in Italy; (6) expected change in the number of homicides in Europe; (7) expected change in the number of homicides solved in Italy; (8) expected change in the position of Italy in corruption ranking; (9) change in the number of civil trials that are solved within one year in Italy. All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes with respect to the sample mean (mean and standard deviation of the dependent variables of the control group are reported at the end of the table). Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Follow-up. To address concerns about the short time horizon, we fielded a follow-up survey roughly fifty days after the initial wave, without participants being aware of its connection to the baseline. To mitigate demand effect, we design the follow-up as a short survey on lifestyle, habits, contact with the public and with public services, and everyday

interactions with the Italian institutions. The take-up was around 50% of the original sample. We use similar outcome variables: trust in state, public administration politicians, and a new question on trust in European institutions. We then assess factual knowledge about the priors to check potential updates driven by our experimental interventions. To minimize demand effects, i.e. the possibility that respondents would infer the purpose of the follow-up or link it to the baseline intervention, the factual knowledge items were placed at the very end of the questionnaire.

Panel A of table 2 presents the effect of the pooled *positive narrative* interventions. All our measures of trust improved for the treated groups, with effects around 8%. Factual knowledge also improved regarding homicides. Panel B reports the effects of each arm separately. T2 (*indirect trends*) and T3 (*link and indirect trend*) are mostly successful in shifting trust. T4 (*link and all trends*) is more successful in shifting factual knowledge, which is expected as only T4 was treated with additional information on improvements in terms of number of homicides, corruption and trials duration.[32]

[32]Tables C4 and C5 report the results for the trust outcomes one by one and for the additional relevant outcomes included in this survey.

Table 3: Priors' heterogeneity.

	(1) trust state	(2) trust admin	(3) trust polit	(4) social trust	(5) donation	(6) inflation perception	(7) useful policies	(8) ask help	(9) call police
T1-T4	0.069**	0.007	0.048*	0.077***	0.090***	-0.050	0.035	-0.003	0.048
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.029)
priors	0.244***	0.291***	0.292***	0.205***	0.240***	0.095**	0.364***	0.006	0.004
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.029)
T1-T4*priors	-0.049*	-0.083**	-0.044	-0.037	-0.080**	0.052	-0.118***	-0.034	-0.030
	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	5,567
R^2	0.101	0.084	0.118	0.076	0.055	0.039	0.093	0.024	0.075

NOTES: This table reports the heterogeneity analysis with respect to the priors beliefs. The first raw shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 versus the control group Co - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see 3.4) on the variables in the columns. In second raw, the priors' coefficients show the correlation between beliefs and outcome variables. The third raw shows the interaction term. *Priors* is the first factor from PCA analysis of individuals' priors on the change in the number of homicides, change in the number of homicides solved, change in the number of corruption ranking and change in the number of civil trials that are solved within one year. Outcome variables: (1) *trust state* is the sum of individuals' trust in the police and judicial system; (2) trust in public administration; (3) *trust politicians* is the sum of individuals' trust in national, regional and municipal politicians; (4) *social trust* is trust in others; (5) *donate* is the amount individuals choose to donate to ONAOMAC; (6) *inflation* expectations; (7) *useful policies* captures the belief that public institutions will implement policies that are beneficial in the long term; (8) *ask help* is the willingness to take action to resolve minor disputes; (9) *call police* capture the reliance on institutional channels rather than on alternative non-state social networks (conditional on *ask help*). All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes with respect to the sample mean. Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Heterogeneity. We expect our intervention to be most effective on individuals whose misperceptions are the greatest. In this analysis (based on the main baseline survey), we construct an aggregate measure of individuals' prior beliefs about institutional performance, denoted as priors, by extracting the first factor component from a PCA analysis. This component is based on individuals' beliefs regarding changes in (inverse) homicides, homicides solved, corruption, and trial speed. Higher values of priors reflect more positive beliefs about institutional performance. Table 3 shows positive effects of the pooled *positive narrative* interventions on all the measures of trust. The *priors*' coefficients show an overall positive and significant correlation between positive beliefs about institutional performance and trust in institutions. The negative and significant interaction terms imply that treated

individuals with more positive priors were less likely to gain trust, in other words, the treatment was more impactful on individuals with more negative priors.

A related hypothesis is that the intervention may be especially effective for individuals who exhibit stronger learning in the follow-up survey—that is, those who better recall or internalize the information provided. To evaluate this, we compute the change in misperceptions from baseline priors to follow-up posteriors. A positive difference indicates a reduction in absolute misperception, consistent with learning the true homicide figures. Because the measure of learning is based on the question regarding the change in homicide rates in Italy—an item included only for the control and main treatment groups—we exclude participants in Treatment 2, who instead received information about changes in EU homicide rates. We then define a *median learner* as an individual whose reduction in misperception is above the median of the relevant distribution. Table C6 shows that treated individuals classified as above median learners are significantly more likely to report increased levels of trust, suggesting that learning plays an important role in mediating the treatment effect.[33]

Mechanism So far, we have established that the positive narrative interventions effectively challenge negative narratives and generally improve trust in institutions. However, we have not yet fully disentangled whether these effects result from a general "good news" sentiment or from attributing success specifically to institutional action - what we refer to as an accountability dynamic. To address this, we designed an additional positive news intervention that i) retains the positive information component but removes the institutional accountability element; ii) it is less likely to be attributed to institutional effort. This was done by informing respondents about the decrease in suicide rates in Italy over the past two decades. To validate the weaker link between suicide rate and state performance, we collected at the end of the survey a question asking respondents to attribute responsibility for the improvements in the presented indicators. As expected, improvements in homicide rates, clearance rates, corruption, and trial durations were more strongly attributed to the state (with 55-60% of answers scoring 6 or above on 1 to 10 scale) compared to the decline in suicide rates (with 45% of answers scoring 6 or above on 1 to 10 scale).

[33] As shown in Tables C7, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12, and C13, we do not find any substantial heterogeneity along other dimensions, i.e. education, employment status, gender, income, voting behavior, or whether the treatment information was considered reliable. We find some evidence of stronger effects for respondents living in Southern regions.

Table 4: Positive news as control.

	(1) trust state	(2) trust admin	(3) trust polit	(4) social trust	(5) donation	(6) inflation perception	(7) useful policies	(8) ask help	(9) call police
PANEL A									
T1-T4	0.110***	0.054	-0.021	0.035	-0.006	0.034	0.073**	0.107***	0.102**
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.042)
PANEL B									
T1	0.140***	0.077*	0.024	0.046	0.027	0.064	0.115***	0.127***	0.108**
	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.044)
T2	0.105**	0.059	-0.047	0.021	-0.040	0.033	0.062	0.070*	0.117**
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.048)
T3	0.064	0.017	-0.064	0.004	-0.012	0.072*	0.046	0.106***	0.075
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.056)
T4	0.133***	0.063	0.006	0.070*	0.000	-0.037	0.067	0.128***	0.110**
	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	5,805	5,805	5,805	5,805	5,805	5,805	5,805	5,805	5,311
R^2	0.067	0.040	0.055	0.050	0.023	0.018	0.023	0.040	0.078
Mean C1	11.81	4.681	12.03	4.330	46.67	4.207	4.626	0.877	8.175
SD C1	4.388	2.364	6.716	2.394	34	3.618	2.251	0.328	2.220

NOTES: This table reports the effects of the *positive narrative* treatments versus the control group C1 - baseline effect of *positive news* (decrease in suicides) - on the variables in the columns. Panel A shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 (T1: general indirect trend; T2: inderect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see 3.4). Panel B shows the effect of each treatment separately. Outcome variables: (1) *trust state* is the sum of individuals' trust in the police and judicial system; (2) trust in public administration; (3) *trust politicians* is the sum of individuals' trust in national, regional and municipal politicians; (4) *social trust* is trust in others; (5) *donate* is the amount individuals choose to donate to ONAOMAC; (6) *inflation* expectations; (7) *useful policies* captures the belif that public institutions will implement policies that are beneficial in the long term; (8) *ask help* is the willingness to take action to resolve minor disputes; (9) *call police* capture the reliance on institutional channels rather than on alternative non-state social networks (conditional on *ask help*). All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes with respect to the sample mean (mean and standard deviation of the dependent variables of the control group are reported at the end of the table). Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 4 shows the results of the four experimental conditions versus the *positive news* (decrease in suicides) group, which serves here as a control. Compared to table 1, where the control group received no information, the effects are weaker and more selective. The pooled *positive narrative* (panel A) increases trust in the state by 10%. However, effects on

other measures of trust remain not significant. We also find positive effects on the belief that Italian institutions are able to conduct useful policies (7%), and on the willingness to ask for help (10%) and call the police (10%) in case of crime victimization. Panel B reports the effects by experimental arm: the effects are generally stronger in T1 and T4. Overall, these findings suggest that the effects observed in our main analysis stem from a combination of the "good news" effect and a targeted accountability mechanism, which is more pronounced for outcomes closely related to our treatment, such as trust in law enforcement and police.

6 Conclusion

This paper examines the potential for breaking negative narratives through positive, data-driven interventions that restore trust in democratic institutions. Our findings suggest that long-term social progress, particularly in the realm of public safety, is often underappreciated or misunderstood by the public due to pervasive negative narratives. Through a large-scale experiment in Italy, we demonstrate that exposing individuals to positive trends in social progress, particularly when tied to institutional accountability, can significantly shift public perceptions and increase trust in key institutions such as law enforcement and the judiciary.

The intervention's success hinges on two main mechanisms: the power of good news and the attribution of institutional accountability. Both elements proved to be effective in countering the prevalent negative views, especially among individuals with more pessimistic priors. Moreover, these effects were not fleeting. Our follow-up survey, almost two months later, confirmed that the intervention's impact on trust persisted, underscoring the long-term potential of such positive narrative interventions.

This research offers valuable insights into how governments and institutions can use targeted communication to rebuild public trust, especially in contexts dominated by negative narratives. Scaling up information experiments as policy interventions faces several challenges that can limit effectiveness, including limited individual attention (Carnes and Henderson, 2025) and self-selection into preferred media outlets common in political communication. Since our focus lies on social progress and higher institutional levels, the credibility of information emerges as the key determinant of policy success. Ultimately, promoting a balanced and credible narrative of social progress can be a powerful means to restore confidence and strengthen institutional legitimacy.

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Appendix.

A The ONAOMAC

The following text, here translated to English, is accessible by the respondents on the donation page via a clearly visible HTML button close to the question.

> During and after World War II, the Carabinieri Corps faced the difficult challenge of losing members who fell in the line of duty.
>
> After the war, the challenge shifted to the loss of numerous law enforcement officers engaged in maintaining public order and combating crime.
>
> To support the Armed Forces' mission of protecting society, ONAOMAC was established in 1948 by Presidential Decree under President Luigi Einaudi. Since its founding, the organization has been committed to honoring the sacrifices of fallen members by providing tangible support to law enforcement through initiatives aimed at assisting the families of the deceased, such as establishing educational institutions designed to care for young people.
>
> The families of service members who died in the line of duty initially received direct assistance: over 5,000 children, many of them orphans of both parents, found not only shelter but also opportunities for education and growth in ONAOMAC's facilities. The male boarding school in San Mauro Torinese and the female boarding school in Mornese are concrete examples of the organization's dedication.
>
> Over the years, the support model evolved. Starting in the 1970s, ONAOMAC transitioned from providing direct assistance through boarding schools to offering indirect support to families, responding to mothers' requests to keep their children with them. This shift allowed the organization to continue its mission, solidifying its role as a pillar of support for the Carabinieri Corps and Italian society.

B Links to the videos

Links to information video for each experimental condition:

T1 - *General facts*: https://youtu.be/5N-8hpqfWSE

T2 - *Facts*: https://youtu.be/bxRW2VvKyQA

T3 - *Link* https://youtu.be/Uf5fqb9MBt0

T4 - *Link and facts*: https://youtu.be/-pFUJkEvdCE

C0 - *Control*: https://youtu.be/AZmIhaCADL4

C1 - *Positive news*: https://youtu.be/bqntlBtoiVo

C Complementary analyses.

C-1 Sample balance and representativeness

Table C1 displays the sample and population frequencies of the representativeness categories. Our sample achieves representativeness along the age and gender dimensions. We however oversample among high education respondents. As we show in Table C7, we capture no heterogeneity along the education dimension, reassuring us of the robustness of our results.

Table C1: Population and sample frequencies: age, gender, education

	Frequencies	
Variables	Sample	Population
Age class		
18-29	0.1739	0.1784
30-39	0.1629	0.1641
40-49	0.2298	0.2014
50-59	0.2299	0.2403
60-69	0.2001	0.1990
70+	0.0135	0.0165
Gender		
Males	0.48	0.4993
Females	0.5184	0.50087
Other	0.016	-
Education		
University degree +	0.27	0.1528

NOTES: Sample and population frequencies by gender, age and education categories. Geographic representativeness is not reported due to our southern oversampling strategy.

Table C2: Ability of covariates to predict the treatment status.

	C0		C1		T1		T2		T3		T4	
	β	p	β	p	β	p	β	p	β	p	β	p
woman	-.002	.814	-.009	.301	.014	.114	.002	.802	-.004	.654	-.002	.843
age	-.001	.806	0	.918	.004	.194	0	.995	-.002	.56	-.001	.697
occupation	-.003	.104	.004	.015	-.004	.037	0	.987	0	.89	.003	.167
degree	.025	.014	-.055	0	0	.978	.002	.86	.005	.599	.023	.025
income	.001	.75	-.008	.004	0	.952	.001	.653	.003	.372	.003	.356
voted	-.007	.526	-.019	.082	-.022	.056	.008	.493	.013	.279	.028	.015

NOTES: The table shows the coefficients β and p-values from a series of regressions of the form $y_i = a + b * Covariate_i + FE_{reg} + e_i$, where y_i is a dummy variable taking value 1 for each of the conditions (controls C0 and C1, and treatments T1, T2, T3 and T4), $Covariate_i$ is the variable listed in the row and FE_{reg} are regional fixed effects.

C-2 Figures and tables

Figure C1: Priors.



NOTE: The blue plots show the distribution of respondents' priors and the red lines report the real changes. Panel A: change in the number of homicides in the last 20 years (decrease of 70%). Panel B: change in the number of homicides solved in the past 20 years (increase of 30%). Panel C: change in the corruption ranking in the past 20 years (increase of 28 positions). Panel D: change in the number of civil trials that are solved within one year in the last decade (increase of 100%).

Figure C2: Change in the number of homicides by region.



NOTES: The red triangles report the real change in the number of homicides between 2006 and 2023 (source: ISTAT). The dark blue circles report the mean of respondents' priors. In light blue the confidence intervals of the means. The distance between the red triangles and the blue dots represents the average misperception at the regional level in our sample.

Figure C3: Priors about change in the number of homicides solved by region.



NOTES: The dark blue circles report the mean of respondents' priors by region. In light blue the confidence intervals of the mean.

Figure C4: Priors about the change in the corruption ranking by region.



NOTES: The dark blue circles report the mean of respondents' priors by region. In light blue the confidence intervals of the mean.

Figure C5: Priors about the change in the speed of the civil trials by region.



NOTES: The dark blue circles report the mean of respondents' priors by region. In light blue the confidence intervals of the mean.

Table C3: Positive narrative and accountability - other outcomes.

	(1) trust police	(2) trust justice	(3) national polit	(4) regional polit	(5) municipal polit	(6) ottimism	(7) connections
PANEL A							
T1-T4	0.187***	0.140**	0.116	0.126*	0.146**	-0.000	-0.033
	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.068)	(0.015)	(0.066)
PANEL B							
T1	0.243**	0.191**	0.233**	0.235***	0.181**	0.011	-0.008
	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.018)	(0.088)
T2	0.130	0.170*	0.058	0.064	0.095	0.007	-0.001
	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.111)	(0.105)	(0.097)	(0.019)	(0.082)
T3	0.155*	-0.002	0.005	0.020	0.100	-0.015	-0.008
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.096)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.021)	(0.081)
T4	0.224***	0.201**	0.170**	0.188**	0.211**	-0.004	-0.119
	(0.084)	(0.099)	(0.081)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.018)	(0.077)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034
R^2	0.065	0.015	0.021	0.027	0.031	0.041	0.022
Mean Co	6.861	5.359	3.743	3.963	4.151	0.405	6.237
SD Co	2.352	2.400	2.379	2.373	2.425	0.491	2.215

NOTES: This table reports the effects of the *positive narrative* treatments versus the control group Co - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions - on the variables in the columns. Panel A shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see section 3.4). Panel B shows the effect of each treatment separately. Outcome variables: (1) trust in the police; (2) trust in the judicial system; (3) trust in national politicians; (4) trust in regional politicians; (5) trust in municipal politicians; (6) optimism about the future of the region; (7) using personal connections for justice after crimes such as theft, robbery, or assault. All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes of the baseline attitudes (mean and standard deviation of the dependent variables of the control group are reported at the end of the table). Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C4: Follow-up - trust disaggregated.

	(1) national polit	(2) regional polit	(3) municipal polit	(4) trust police	(5) trust justice
PANEL A					
T1-T4	0.067	0.069*	0.073	0.076	0.072**
	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.032)
PANEL B					
T1	0.042	0.078	0.092	0.076	0.055
	(0.064)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.048)
T2	0.089*	0.067	0.064	0.100*	0.106**
	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.048)
T3	0.052	0.063	0.060	0.086*	0.069
	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.044)
T4	0.083	0.067	0.077	0.040	0.056
	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.044)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	3,091	3,091	3,091	3,091	3,091
R^2	0.048	0.052	0.059	0.087	0.049
Mean Co	3.625	3.872	4.025	5.956	4.748
SD Co	2.371	2.361	2.416	2.499	2.390

NOTES: This table reports the effects of the *positive narrative* treatments versus the control group Co - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions - on the variables in the columns two months after our main intervention. Panel A shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see section 3.4). Panel B shows the effect of each treatment separately. Outcome variables: (1) trust in national politicians; (2) trust regional politicians; (3) trust in municipal politicians; (4) trust in the police; (5) trust in the judicial system. All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes of the baseline attitudes (mean and standard deviation of the dependent variables of the control group are reported at the end of the table). Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C5: Follow-up - other outcomes.

	(1) optimism ITA	(2) optimism EU	(3) prioritize needs	(4) satisfaction	(5) change	(6) positive change	(7) time change
PANEL A							
T1-T4	0.024	0.109**	0.056	0.054	0.030	0.030	0.005
	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.051)
PANEL B							
T1	-0.052	0.081	0.062	0.024	0.080	0.026	-0.027
	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.066)
T2	0.084*	0.183***	0.062	0.067	-0.035	-0.006	0.048
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.074)
T3	-0.005	0.079	0.058	0.059	0.019	0.019	-0.030
	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.059)
T4	0.070	0.089	0.042	0.067	0.063	0.085	0.030
	(0.050)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.067)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	3,092	3,092	3,091	3,091	3,091	3,091	2,238
R^2	0.034	0.042	0.029	0.035	0.017	0.020	0.031
Mean Co	2.159	2.156	4.828	4.172	0.715	-0.0310	2.297
SD Co	0.779	0.755	2.698	2.342	0.452	0.975	0.910

NOTES: This table reports the effects of the *positive narrative* treatments versus the control group Co - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions - on the variables in the columns two months after our main intervention. Panel A shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see section 3.4). Panel B shows the effect of each treatment separately. Outcome variables: (1) optimism about about the future social well-being and prosperity in Italy; (2) optimism about about the future social well-being and prosperity in Europe; (3) perception that Italian institutions prioritize the needs of the country; (4) satisfaction with respect to Italian institutions; (5) perception of change in the quality of Italian institutions; (6) perception of positive change in the quality of Italian institutions; (7) time span of the change in the quality of Italian institutions (2-3 years; 10 years; from the 1980s; from the 1920s). All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes of the baseline attitudes (mean and standard deviation of the dependent variables of the control group are reported at the end of the table). Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C6: Follow-up - learning.

	(1) trust state	(2) trust admin	(3) trust polit	(4) trust EU
T2-T4	0.067	0.041	0.030	0.045
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.043)
median learner	0.001	-0.016	-0.027	-0.198
	(0.178)	(0.104)	(0.116)	(0.124)
T2-T4*median learner	0.211	0.325**	0.410**	0.458***
	(0.217)	(0.134)	(0.157)	(0.142)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	2,483	2,483	2,483	2,483
R^2	0.128	0.119	0.128	0.105
Mean Co	10.70	4.372	11.52	4.326
SD Co	4.308	2.297	6.473	2.548

NOTES: This table reports the heterogeneity analysis with respect to the *median learner*. First, we compute misperception as the difference in absolute value between prior (posterior) beliefs and the true change in number of homicides (see Figure 1). Second, we compute the difference between misperception in priors and misperception in posteriors. When the difference is positive, misperception in absolute value decreased, suggesting that the individuals *learned* about the true number of homicides. Hence, we define *median learner* as a dummy taking value 1 if the learning performance is above the median, 0 if below. Panel A shows the effect of the pooled treatments T2-T4 (T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see section 3.4). Panel B shows the effect of each treatment separately. Outcome variables: (1) *trust state* is the sum of individuals' trust in the police and judicial system; (2) trust in public administration; (3) *trust politicians* is the sum of individuals' trust in national, regional and municipal politicians; (4) trust in European institutions. All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes with respect to the sample mean (mean and standard deviation of the dependent variables of the control group are reported at the end of the table). Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C7: Heterogeneity - degree (D).

	(1) trust state	(2) trust admin.	(3) trust polit	(4) social trust	(5) donation	(6) inflation perception	(7) useful policies	(8) ask help	(9) call police
T1-T4	0.080**	0.041	0.050	0.080**	0.081*	-0.059	0.068*	0.008	0.043
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.034)
D	0.114*	0.169**	0.065	0.187***	-0.066	-0.061	0.170***	0.081	0.024
	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.066)
T1-T4*D	-0.081	-0.097	0.010	0.013	0.038	0.030	-0.091	-0.033	0.022
	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.074)	(0.060)	(0.065)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	5,567
R^2	0.052	0.035	0.054	0.053	0.024	0.021	0.022	0.024	0.074

NOTES: This table reports the heterogeneity analysis with respect to individuals' education level. The first raw shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 versus the control group C0 - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see section 3.4) on the variables in the columns. In second raw, the degree's coefficients show the correlation between education and outcome variables. The third raw shows the interaction term. *Degree* takes value one for individual with a degree, zero otherwise. Outcome variables: (1) *trust state* is the sum of individuals' trust in the police and judicial system; (2) trust in public administration; (3) *trust politicians* is the sum of individuals' trust in national, regional and municipal politicians; (4) *social trust* is trust in others; (5) *donate* is the amount individuals choose to donate to ONAOMAC; (6) *inflation* expectations; (7) *useful policies* captures the belief that public institutions will implement policies that are beneficial in the long term; (8) *ask help* is the willingness to take action to resolve minor disputes; (9) *call police* capture the reliance on institutional channels rather than on alternative non-state social networks (conditional on *ask help*). All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes of the baseline attitudes. Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C8: Heterogeneity - employment (E).

	(1) trust state	(2) trust admin	(3) trust polit	(4) social trust	(5) donation	(6) inflation perception	(7) useful policies	(8) ask help	(9) call police
T1-T4	0.054	0.005	0.025	0.035	0.188***	-0.072*	0.034	-0.035	0.053
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.051)
E	0.016	0.040	-0.050	0.036	0.147**	-0.039	0.033	-0.047	-0.009
	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.061)
T1-T4*E	0.002	0.010	0.045	0.079	-0.164**	0.040	0.010	0.055	-0.009
	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.065)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	5,567
R^2	0.052	0.034	0.053	0.048	0.025	0.020	0.020	0.024	0.074

NOTES: This table reports the heterogeneity analysis with respect to the employment status, where currently employed, self-employed, or part time implies E=1, all other statuses E=0. The first raw shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 versus the control group C0 - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see section 3.4) on the variables in the columns. In second raw, the employment's coefficients show the correlation with the outcome variables. The third raw shows the interaction term. Outcome variables: (1) *trust state* is the sum of individuals' trust in the police and judicial system; (2) trust in public administration; (3) *trust politicians* is the sum of individuals' trust in national, regional and municipal politicians; (4) *social trust* is trust in others; (5) *donate* is the amount individuals choose to donate to ONAOMAC; (6) *inflation* expectations; (7) *useful policies* captures the belief that public institutions will implement policies that are beneficial in the long term; (8) *ask help* is the willingness to take action to resolve minor disputes; (9) *call police* capture the reliance on institutional channels rather than on alternative non-state social networks (conditional on *ask help*). All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes of the baseline attitudes. Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C9: Heterogeneity - gender (W).

	(1) trust state	(2) trust admin	(3) trust polit	(4) social trust	(5) donation	(6) inflation perception	(7) useful policies	(8) ask help	(9) call police
T1-T4	0.054	0.015	-0.003	0.058	0.064	0.031	0.030	0.013	0.084*
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.045)
W	-0.014	-0.017	-0.159**	-0.185***	-0.077	0.351***	-0.049	0.139**	0.156**
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.060)
T1-T4*W	0.003	-0.005	0.106	0.038	0.054	-0.154***	0.021	-0.030	-0.069
	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.067)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	5,567
R^2	0.052	0.034	0.054	0.046	0.024	0.022	0.020	0.024	0.075

NOTES: This table reports the heterogeneity analysis with respect to gender. The first raw shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 versus the control group C0 - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see section 3.4) on the variables in the columns. In second raw, the woman' coefficients show the correlation with the outcome variables. The third raw shows the interaction term. Outcome variables: (1) *trust state* is the sum of individuals' trust in the police and judicial system; (2) trust in public administration; (3) *trust politicians* is the sum of individuals' trust in national, regional and municipal politicians; (4) *social trust* is trust in others; (5) *donate* is the amount individuals choose to donate to ONAOMAC; (6) *inflation* expectations; (7) *useful policies* captures the belief that public institutions will implement policies that are beneficial in the long term; (8) *ask help* is the willingness to take action to resolve minor disputes; (9) *call police* capture the reliance on institutional channels rather than on alternative non-state social networks (conditional on *ask help*). All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes of the baseline attitudes. Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C10: Heterogeneity - high income (HI).

	(1) trust state	(2) trust admin	(3) trust polit	(4) social trust	(5) donation	(6) inflation perception	(7) useful policies	(8) ask help	(9) call police
T1-T4	0.055*	0.005	0.029	0.078**	0.107***	-0.038	0.030	0.008	0.059*
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.031)
HI	-0.205**	-0.228**	-0.268***	-0.095	0.082	0.106	-0.139	0.005	-0.119
	(0.087)	(0.101)	(0.092)	(0.078)	(0.104)	(0.091)	(0.107)	(0.079)	(0.102)
T1-T4*HI	-0.008	0.030	0.165*	0.008	-0.108	-0.087	0.072	-0.084	-0.093
	(0.098)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.081)	(0.096)	(0.073)	(0.121)	(0.089)	(0.081)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	5,567
R^2	0.054	0.035	0.054	0.046	0.024	0.020	0.020	0.024	0.076

NOTES: This table reports the heterogeneity analysis with respect to high income. The first raw shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 versus the control group C0 - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see section 3.4) on the variables in the columns. In second raw, the high income's coefficients show the correlation with the outcome variables. The third raw shows the interaction term. Outcome variables: (1) *trust state* is the sum of individuals' trust in the police and judicial system; (2) trust in public administration; (3) *trust politicians* is the sum of individuals' trust in national, regional and municipal politicians; (4) *social trust* is trust in others; (5) *donate* is the amount individuals choose to donate to ONAOMAC; (6) *inflation* expectations; (7) *useful policies* captures the belief that public institutions will implement policies that are beneficial in the long term; (8) *ask help* is the willingness to take action to resolve minor disputes; (9) *call police* capture the reliance on institutional channels rather than on alternative non-state social networks (conditional on *ask help*). All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes of the baseline attitudes. Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C11: Heterogeneity - south (S).

	(1) trust state	(2) trust admin	(3) trust polit	(4) social trust	(5) donation	(6) inflation perception	(7) useful policies	(8) ask help	(9) call police
T1-T4	0.091**	0.046	-0.014	-0.011	0.018	-0.032	-0.010	0.020	-0.009
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.036)	(0.045)
T1-T4*S	-0.058	-0.057	0.105*	0.145***	0.121*	-0.028	0.080	-0.036	0.091
	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.048)	(0.058)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	5,567
R^2	0.052	0.034	0.053	0.047	0.025	0.020	0.020	0.024	0.074

NOTES: This table reports the heterogeneity analysis with respect to living in a Southern region. The first raw shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 versus the control group C0 - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see section 3.4) on the variables in the columns. The second raw shows the interaction term. Outcome variables: (1) *trust state* is the sum of individuals' trust in the police and judicial system; (2) trust in public administration; (3) *trust politicians* is the sum of individuals' trust in national, regional and municipal politicians; (4) *social trust* is trust in others; (5) *donate* is the amount individuals choose to donate to ONAOMAC; (6) *inflation* expectations; (7) *useful policies* captures the belief that public institutions will implement policies that are beneficial in the long term; (8) *ask help* is the willingness to take action to resolve minor disputes; (9) *call police* capture the reliance on institutional channels rather than on alternative non-state social networks (conditional on *ask help*). All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes of the baseline attitudes. Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C12: Heterogeneity - voted (V).

	(1) trust state	(2) trust admin	(3) trust polit	(4) social trust	(5) donation	(6) inflation perception	(7) useful policies	(8) ask help	(9) call police
T1-T4	0.020	0.012	-0.028	0.114*	0.174**	0.006	0.039	0.073	0.086
	(0.082)	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.067)	(0.091)	(0.091)
V	0.228***	0.214***	0.214***	0.214***	0.143*	0.055	0.174***	0.149*	0.145*
	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.077)	(0.090)	(0.064)	(0.083)	(0.085)
T1-T4*V	0.043	-0.002	0.097	-0.043	-0.100	-0.068	0.000	-0.093	-0.046
	(0.089)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.066)	(0.089)	(0.094)	(0.072)	(0.101)	(0.105)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	6,034	5,567
R^2	0.052	0.033	0.053	0.046	0.024	0.020	0.020	0.024	0.074

NOTES: This table reports the heterogeneity analysis with respect to having voted in the past elections. The first raw shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 versus the control group C0 - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see section 3.4) on the variables in the columns. In second raw, the voted's coefficients show the correlation with the outcome variables. The third raw shows the interaction term. Outcome variables: (1) *trust state* is the sum of individuals' trust in the police and judicial system; (2) trust in public administration; (3) *trust politicians* is the sum of individuals' trust in national, regional and municipal politicians; (4) *social trust* is trust in others; (5) *donate* is the amount individuals choose to donate to ONAOMAC; (6) *inflation* expectations; (7) *useful policies* captures the belief that public institutions will implement policies that are beneficial in the long term; (8) *ask help* is the willingness to take action to resolve minor disputes; (9) *call police* capture the reliance on institutional channels rather than on alternative non-state social networks (conditional on *ask help*). All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes of the baseline attitudes. Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C13: Heterogeneity - reliable information (RI).

	(1) trust state	(2) trust admin	(3) trust polit	(4) social trust	(5) donation	(6) inflation perception	(7) useful policies	(8) ask help	(9) call police
T4	0.068	0.001	-0.160	1.283	-0.652**	0.013	-0.183	0.023	0.163
	(0.496)	(0.481)	(0.168)	(2.415)	(0.276)	(0.031)	(0.160)	(0.023)	(0.138)
RI	2.700***	1.871***	0.434***	1.945	-0.476***	0.124***	0.693***	0.056***	0.498***
	(0.255)	(0.328)	(0.089)	(1.450)	(0.140)	(0.022)	(0.100)	(0.012)	(0.093)
T4*RI	0.178	0.346	0.349*	-1.269	0.416	0.020	0.234	-0.019	-0.167
	(0.564)	(0.590)	(0.201)	(2.826)	(0.299)	(0.035)	(0.180)	(0.025)	(0.149)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	4,810	4,810	4,810	4,810	4,810	4,810	4,810	4,810	4,438
R^2	0.061	0.042	0.047	0.018	0.021	0.075	0.036	0.018	0.067

NOTES: This table reports the heterogeneity analysis with respect to individual's perception that the information received during the survey is credible. The first raw shows the effect of the pooled treatments T1-T4 versus the control group C0 - baseline effect of mentioning the institutions (T1: general indirect trend; T2: indirect trend; T3: link & indirect trend; T4: link & all trends. For a detailed description see section 3.4) on the variables in the columns. In second raw, the reliable info's coefficients show the correlation with the outcome variables. The third raw shows the interaction term. Outcome variables: (1) *trust state* is the sum of individuals' trust in the police and judicial system; (2) trust in public administration; (3) *trust politicians* is the sum of individuals' trust in national, regional and municipal politicians; (4) *social trust* is trust in others; (5) *donate* is the amount individuals choose to donate to ONAOMAC; (6) *inflation* expectations; (7) *useful policies* captures the belief that public institutions will implement policies that are beneficial in the long term; (8) *ask help* is the willingness to take action to resolve minor disputes; (9) *call police* capture the reliance on institutional channels rather than on alternative non-state social networks (conditional on *ask help*). All coefficients can be interpreted as percentage standard deviation changes of the baseline attitudes. Controls included in all regressions: gender, age, income, high school dummy, voted at last elections, following the news regularly. Fixed effects included in all regressions: region of residence and born in Italy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

D The survey

Breaking Negative Narratives in Low Trust Environments

Authors:

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Survey Flow

Start of Block: Intro

Q1
Buongiorno, e grazie per la tua partecipazione a questa indagine.
Siamo ricercatori facenti parte di un consorzio di università.
Ci piacerebbe conoscere la tua opinione personale su alcune tematiche di interesse generale.
La tua partecipazione al sondaggio è volontaria, e potrai interrompere, se lo desideri, in qualsiasi momento. Nessuna informazione che possa identificarti verrà registrata. I risultati includeranno dati di riepilogo sulla base dei quali non potrai mai essere identificato/a. I dati raccolti saranno conservati sui nostri server e saranno mantenuti riservati. I dati anonimi potrebbero essere messi a disposizione di altri ricercatori a scopo di replicazione di questa indagine.
É estremamente importante per il successo della nostra ricerca che tu ci **fornisca la tua sincera opinione**, e che **legga tutte le domande attentamente** prima di rispondere. Qualora non sia sicuro/a su quale sia la risposta corretta a qualche domanda, fornisci la risposta che ritieni più adatta. Abbi cura però di prendere il tempo necessario per leggere e comprendere la domanda.
Fornire risposte senza prestare la necessaria attenzione o saltare domande potrebbe comportare la perdita del tuo compenso di partecipazione. È molto importante per noi che **l'intero questionario** venga completato una volta iniziato. In media, questa indagine richiederà circa 15 minuti.

- ○ Sì, voglio continuare (1)
- ○ No, non voglio continuare (2)

End of Block: Intro

Start of Block: Demogs

Female Sei:

- ○ Uomo (0)
- ○ Donna (1)
- ○ Altro (3)

Age Quale è la tua età?

- ○ 18-29 (1)
- ○ 30-39 (2)
- ○ 40-49 (3)
- ○ 50-59 (4)
- ○ 60-69 (5)
- ○ 70+ (6)

Arearesid In quale provincia sei residente?
Regione (1)
Provincia (2)

▼ Abruzzo (1) ... Veneto ~ Vicenza ~ VI (240)

X→

Single Quale è il tuo stato civile?

- ○ Celibe/nubile (Mai sposato/a, vedovo/a, Separato/a, Divorziato/a) (1)
- ○ Sposato/a, Unione civile, Coabitazione (0)

---

*

Familysize Di quante persone consiste la tua famiglia (includendo te stesso)? Se non ci sono minori, scrivi 0.

- ○ Adulti (1) _____
- ○ Minori (età inferiore a 18 anni) (2) _____

Income A quanto ammontano **i redditi mensili** totali **del tuo nucleo familiare, al netto delle imposte**? (Includi tutte le fonti di reddito della tua famiglia: stipendi, borse di studio, prestazioni previdenziali, dividendi da azioni, redditi da immobili in affitto, assistenza ai figli e alimenti, ecc. Non siamo interessati al tipo di fonte di reddito. Ti preghiamo solo di indicare il totale delle entrate mensili guadagnato da tutti i membri della tuo nucleo familiare).

- ○ <1000 (1)
- ○ 1000-1999 (2)
- ○ 2000-2999 (3)
- ○ 3000-3999 (4)
- ○ 4000-4999 (5)
- ○ 5000-5999 (6)
- ○ 6000-6999 (7)
- ○ 7000+ (8)

Page Break

JS

Polor Dove ti collochi lungo lo spettro politico, dove 1 rappresenta la sinistra e 10 rappresenta la destra?

- 1 (sinistra) (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)
- 6 (6)
- 7 (7)
- 8 (8)
- 9 (9)
- 10 (destra) (10)

Page Break

Voted Hai votato nelle ultime elezioni nazionali?

- Sì (1)
- No (0)

Wouldvote Quale di questi partiti voteresti se le prossime elezioni politiche nazionali dovessero avere luogo domenica prossima? Qualora il tuo partito preferito non dovesse figurare tra le scelte, indica il partito che più si avvicina alla tua scelta preferita.

- Fratelli d'Italia (1)
- Partito Democratico (2)
- Lega per Salvini Premier (3)
- Movimento 5 Stelle (4)
- Italia Viva (5)
- Forza Italia (6)
- Azione (7)

End of Block: Demogs

Start of Block: Obfuscation 1

Information Su quale piattaforma ti informi abitualmente?

- ○ Telegiornale (1)
- ○ Social media (social come facebook o instagrtam, blogs, ecc) (2)
- ○ Radio/podcasts (3)
- ○ Giornali online/App (4)
- ○ Giornali (5)
- ○ Non mi informo (6)

Skip To: Q41 If Su quale piattaforma ti informi abitualmente? = Non mi informo

Page Break

JS

Q40 Ordina le seguenti fonti di informazione in base alla frequenza con la quale le consulti, dalla più frequente (numero 5) a quella meno frequente (numero 1)

_____ Telegiornale (1)
_____ Social media (social come facebook o instagrtam, blogs, ecc) (2)
_____ Radio/podcasts (3)
_____ Giornali online/App (4)
_____ Giornali (5)

Page Break

Display This Question:

If Su quale piattaforma ti informi abitualmente? = Non mi informo

JS

Q41 Hai risposto che non ti informi. Dicci di più sulla tua risposta scegliendo la motivazione più adatta.

- ○ Troppa informazione (1)
- ○ Troppe cattive notizie (2)
- ○ Non serve a nulla (3)
- ○ Ho già tutte le informazioni di cui ho bisogno (4)
- ○ Altro (5)

End of Block: Obfuscation 1

Start of Block: Prior homicide

JS

priorhomicide Come ritieni sia cambiato in termini percentuali, negli ultimi 20 anni, il **numero di omicidi commessi in Italia**? Valori **positivi: più omicidi** rispetto al passato. Valori **negativi: meno omicidi** rispetto al passato. Usa la barra per dirci quanto secondo te è **cambiato**, **in percentuale**, il numero di omicidi. Il cursore apparirà quando clicchi sulla barra.

- - - - - - - - - - - 0 10203040506070809010010090807060504030201 0

()	

End of Block: Prior homicide

Start of Block: Prior clear

JS

priorsolved Come ritieni sia cambiata, negli ultimi 20 anni, **la percentuale di omicidi risolti con identificazione del colpevole**? Valori **positivi: più omicidi** risolti rispetto al passato. Valori **negativi: meno omicidi** risolti rispetto al passato. Usa la barra per dirci quanto

secondo te è **cambiato**, in **punti percentuali**, il numero di omicidi risolti. Il cursore apparirà quando clicchi sulla barra.

- - - - - - - - - - 0 10203040506070809010010090807060504030201 0

()	

End of Block: Prior clear

Start of Block: Prior corr

JS

priorcorrupt Come ritieni sia cambiata, negli ultimi 20 anni, la **posizione dell'Italia nella classifica dei paesi per livello di corruzione**? Ai **primi posti**: i paesi **meno corrotti**. Agli **ultimi posti:** i paesi **più corrotti**. Usa la barra per dirci come è **cambiata**, **in numero di posizioni,** la posizione dell'Italia nella classifica. Il cursore apparirà quando clicchi sulla barra.

- - - - - - - - - - 0 10203040506070809010010090807060504030201 0

()	

End of Block: Prior corr

Start of Block: Prior trial

JS

priortrials Come ritieni sia cambiata, negli ultimi 20 anni, **la percentuale di processi civili chiusi entro un anno**? Valori **positivi: più processi** chiusi entro un anno che in passato. Valori **negativi: meno processi** chiusi entro un anno che in passato. Usa la barra per dirci quanto secondo te è **cambiato**, in **punti percentuali**, il numero di processi chiusi entro un anno. Il cursore apparirà quando clicchi sulla barra.

- - - - - - - - - - 0 10203040506070809010010090807060504030201 0

()	

End of Block: Prior trial

Start of Block: NIN

Q61 Vorremmo ora avere il tuo paere su alcune questioni di interesse comune. Guarda il video nella pagina seguente prima di proseguire.

Page Break

Q53 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

JS

Q50

Page Break

Q63 Puoi riconsultare le informazioni che ti sono state presentate nel video cliccando sul pulsante "Indietro". Altrimenti clicca su "Avanti" per proseguire.

End of Block: NIN

Start of Block: N

Q62 Vorremmo ora avere il tuo paere su alcune questioni di interesse comune. Guarda il video nella pagina seguente prima di proseguire.

Page Break

Q56 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

JS

Q51

Page Break

Q64 Puoi riconsultare le informazioni che ti sono state presentate nel video cliccando sul pulsante "Indietro". Altrimenti clicca su "Avanti" per proseguire.

End of Block: N

Start of Block: F

Q176 Vorremmo ora avere il tuo paere su alcune questioni di interesse comune. Guarda il video nella pagina seguente prima di proseguire.

Page Break

Q177 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

JS

Q178

Page Break

Q179 Puoi riconsultare le informazioni che ti sono state presentate nel video cliccando sul pulsante "Indietro". Altrimenti clicca su "Avanti" per proseguire.

End of Block: F

Start of Block: NI

Q54 Vorremmo ora avere il tuo paere su alcune questioni di interesse comune. Guarda il video nella pagina seguente prima di proseguire.

Page Break

Q52 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

JS

Q49

Page Break

Q60 Puoi riconsultare le informazioni che ti sono state presentate nel video cliccando sul pulsante "Indietro". Altrimenti clicca su "Avanti" per proseguire.

End of Block: NI

Start of Block: NG

Q180 Vorremmo ora avere il tuo paere su alcune questioni di interesse comune. Guarda il video nella pagina seguente prima di proseguire.

Page Break

Q181 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

JS

Q182

Page Break

Q183 Puoi riconsultare le informazioni che ti sono state presentate nel video cliccando sul pulsante "Indietro". Altrimenti clicca su "Avanti" per proseguire.

End of Block: NG

Start of Block: Inflation question

JS

Q186 I prezzi al consumo variano nel corso del tempo, ciò che comunemente viene chiamato **inflazione**. Quanto pensi varieranno i prezzi al consumo nel 2025? Ti chiediamo di darci la tua stima del tasso di inflazinone che sarà misurato a fine 2025 considerando l'intero anno. Forniscici la tua risposta muovendo il cursore in basso. Il cursore apparirà una volta che clicchi sulla barra.

- -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
10

()

End of Block: Inflation question

Start of Block: Obfuscation 2

Q43 In che misura sei d'accordo con le seguenti affermazioni?

JS

Q44 L'era delle riviste cartacee è finita, dovrebbero lasciare spazio a periodici online

- Pienamente d'accordo (1)
- Piuttosto d'accordo (2)
- Neutrale (3)
- Piuttosto in disaccordo (4)
- Pienamente in disaccordo (5)

Q45 L'era delle televisioni è finita, dovrebbero lasciare spazio a trasmissioni online

- Pienamente d'accordo (1)
- Piuttosto d'accordo (2)
- Neutrale (3)
- Piuttosto in disaccordo (4)
- Pienamente in disaccordo (5)

Page Break

JS

Q46 Quale è, secondo te, l'ostacolo maggiore alla diffusione dei periodici online?

- [ ] Leggibilità (1)
- [ ] Impatto dei contenuti (2)
- [ ] La diffusione della tecnologia adatta (3)
- [ ] Il tempo a disposizione del pubblico (4)
- [ ] L'esposizione continuativa a contenuti mediatici irrilevanti (5)

Q48 Quale è, secondo te, l'ostacolo maggiore alla diffusione delle trasmissioni online?

- [ ] Accessibilità (1)
- [ ] Impatto dei contenuti (2)
- [ ] La diffusione della tecnologia adatta (3)
- [ ] Il tempo a disposizione del pubblico (4)
- [ ] L'esposizione continuativa a contenuti mediatici irrilevanti (5)

End of Block: Obfuscation 2

Start of Block: Donation

Q11 **Ti mettiamo ora a disposizione 1€**. Questo è un nuovo euro e la tua scelta non avrà alcun impatto sulle scelte da te precedentemente fatte. Puoi decidere quanti centesimi dell'Euro messoti a disposizine vuoi donare all'ONAOMAC. L'ONAOMAC è un **ente governativo** che fornisce **supporto all'Arma dei Carabinieri.** Ciò che decidi di non donare, ti sarà corrisposto insieme al tuo compenso di partecipazione.

JS

Behinsttrust Muovendo il cursore sulla barra verso **destra**, sposterai centesimi **verso l'ONAOMAC** (Organo Governativo). Il cursore apparirà quando clicchi sulla barra.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

()	

JS

Q187 Per sapere di più sull'ONAOMAC, clicca sul pulsante qui sotto:

End of Block: Donation

Start of Block: Action

JS

Action Immagina ora che tu, un tuo conoscente, o un membro della tua famiglia sia stato **vittima di un crimine**. Potrebbe trattarsi, ad esempio, del furto di un oggetto personale (come una moto o un'auto), o di una rapina subita per strada, dove qualcuno ha minacciato o usato la forza per rubare denaro o altri beni. **Come agiresti in risposta alla situazione descritta?**

- ○ Non farei nulla (0)
- ○ Cercherei aiuto per avere un’adeguata risoluzione o compensazione per l’accaduto (1)

Page Break

Display This Question:

If Immagina ora che tu, un tuo conoscente, o un membro della tua famiglia sia stato vittima di un cr... = Cercherei aiuto per avere un'adeguata risoluzione o compensazione per l'accaduto

JS X→

Legalaction Rimanendo sul caso di prima, hai detto che cercheresti aiuto nella risoluzione del fatto. Su una scala da 1 a 10, dove 1 indica "Mai" e 10 indica "Sempre", ti rivolgeresti alle forze dell'ordine e alle autorità giudiziarie preposte?

- 1 (Mai) (0)
- …
- 10 (Sempre) (9)

End of Block: Action

Start of Block: Outcomes 2 (inst trust)

JS

trustnatpol Su una scala da 1 a 10, dove 1 indica "Nessuna" e 10 indica "Molta", vorremmo sapere quanta fiducia riponi nelle seguenti istituzioni. Quanta fiducia riponi nei **politici nazionali**?

- 1 (nessuna) (1)
- …
- 10 (molta) (10)

JS

trustcompol Su una scala da 1 a 10, dove 1 indica “Nessuna” e 10 indica “Molta”, vorremmo sapere quanta fiducia riponi nelle seguenti istituzioni. Quanta fiducia riponi nei **politici comunali**?

- 1 (nessuna) (1)
- …
- 10 (molta) (10)

JS

trustregpol Su una scala da 1 a 10, dove 1 indica “Nessuna” e 10 indica “Molta”, vorremmo sapere quanta fiducia riponi nelle seguenti istituzioni. Quanta fiducia riponi nei **politici regionali**?

- 1 (nessuna) (1)
- …
- 10 (molta) (10)

JS

trustpolice Su una scala da 1 a 10, dove 1 indica “Nessuna” e 10 indica “Molta”, vorremmo sapere quanta fiducia riponi nelle seguenti istituzioni. Quanta fiducia riponi nelle **forze dell'ordine**?

- 1 (nessuna) (1)
- …
- 10 (molta) (10)

JS

trustjustice Su una scala da 1 a 10, dove 1 indica “Nessuna” e 10 indica “Molta”, vorremmo sapere quanta fiducia riponi nelle seguenti istituzioni. Quanta fiducia riponi nel **sistema giudiziario**?

- 1 (nessuna) (1)
- …
- 10 (molta) (10)

JS

trustpa Su una scala da 1 a 10, dove 1 indica “Nessuna” e 10 indica “Molta”, vorremmo sapere quanta fiducia riponi nelle seguenti istituzioni. Quanta fiducia riponi nella **pubblica amministrazione**?

- 1 (nessuna) (1)
- …
- 10 (molta) (10)

End of Block: Outcomes 2 (inst trust)

Start of Block: Outcomes 3

JS

Q28 In generale, pensi che ci si possa fidare della maggior parte delle persone o che non si possa mai stare abbastanza attenti nel trattare con gli altri? Dacci la tua opinione su una scala da 1 (bisogna fare attenzione) a 10 (ci si può fidare degli altri).

- 1 (bisogna fare attenzione) (1)
- …
- 10 (ci si può fidare) (10)

Page Break

Pessimism Dicci se ti senti molto pessimista, piuttosto pessimista, piuttosto ottimista, molto ottimista a riguardo del futuro della tua regione ${Arearesid /ChoiceGroup/SelectedAnswers/1}

- Molto pessimista (4)
- Piuttosto pessimista (3)
- Piuttosto ottimista (2)
- Molto ottimista (1)

Pessimism Dicci se ti senti molto ottimista, piuttosto ottimista, piuttosto pessimista, molto pessimista a riguardo del futuro della tua regione ${Arearesid /ChoiceGroup/SelectedAnswers/1}

- Molto ottimista (4)
- Piuttosto ottimista (3)
- Piuttosto pessimista (2)
- Molto pessimista (1)

Page Break

JS

Q38 Su una scala da 1 a 10, dove 1 indica “per nulla” e 10 indica “del tutto” **quanto ritieni che le istituzioni pubbliche mettano in opera politiche utili nel lungo periodo?**

- 1 (Per nulla) (1)
- …
- 10 (Del tutto) (10)

Page Break

JS

Q17 Su una scala da 1 a 10, dove 1 indica "Non problematico" e 10 "Molto problematico", quanto ritieni sia **eticamente problematico l'utilizzo di connessioni sociali personali per ottenere giustizia** dopo aver subito piccoli reati (come per esempio furto, rapina, o aggressione)?

- 1 (non problematico) (1)
- …
- 10 (molto problematico) (10)

End of Block: Outcomes 3

Start of Block: Mafia presence

JS

Q33 In che misura ritieni sia presente la mafia nella provincia in cui vivi?

- Molto presente (3)
- Poco presente (1)
- Del tutto assente (0)

Page Break

Q37 Alcune persone pensano che la mafia si piu forte dello stato, mentre altre pensano il contrario. **Secondo te, è più forte la mafia o lo stato nella tua provincia?**

- ○ È più forte lo stato (1)
- ○ È più forte la mafia (0)

End of Block: Mafia presence

Start of Block: Staircase risk

Display This Question:

If Tookrisk != 1

And Tooktime != 1

Q188 Vorremmo ora presentarti con **5 situazioni** diverse in cui dovrai dirci quale tra due opzioni proposte preferiresti. Esprimi quella che sarebbe la scelta che realmente preferiresti se ti si presentasse l'occasione.

End of Block: Staircase risk

Start of Block: Staircase patience

Display This Question:

If Tookrisk != 1

And Tooktime != 1

Q190 Vorremmo ora presentarti con **5 situazioni** diverse in cui dovrai dirci quale tra due opzioni proposte preferiresti. Esprimi quella che sarebbe la scelta che realmente preferiresti se ti si presentasse l'occasione.

Page Break

Follows the staircase risk preference elicitation task as of Falk et al. 2024

Display This Question:

If Tookrisk = 1

Or Tooktime = 1

Q191 Ora ti descriveremo 5 **nuove situazioni, diverse dalle precedenti**, in cui dovrai nuovamente dirci quale tra due opzioni proposte preferiresti. Esprimi quella che sarebbe la scelta che realmente preferiresti se ti si presentasse l'occasione.

Page Break

Follows the staircase time preference elicitation as of Falk et al. (2024)

End of Block: Staircase patience

Start of Block: Further demographics

JS

educ Quale è il titolo di studio più elevato da te conseguito?

- Scuola primaria (1)
- Scuola media (2)
- Educazione professionale (3)
- Liceo (4)
- Laurea di primo livello (5)
- Laurea di secondo livello (master o specializzazione) (6)
- Dottorato di ricerca (7)

occup Quale è il tuo status occupazionale corrente?

- ○ Impiegato/a (1)
- ○ Impiegato/a part-time (2)
- ○ Lavoro in proprio (3)
- ○ Non impiegato/a ed alla ricerca di un impiego (4)
- ○ Studente/ssa o studente/ssa lavoratore/trice (5)
- ○ Pensioanto/a (6)
- ○ Casalingo/a (7)
- ○ Non impiegato/a e non alla ricerca di un impiego (8)

Page Break

JS X→ X→

Q184 In quale regione italiana hai vissuto fino all'età di 15 anni? Qualora avessi vissuto in più di una regione, indica la regione nella quale hai vissuto più a lungo.

▼ Abruzzo (1) ... Altro (estero) (0)

Page Break

JS X→

itborn Sei nato/a in Italia?

- ○ Sì (1)
- ○ No (0)

parentsitborn I tuoi genitori o tutori legali sono entrambi nati in Italia?

- Sì (1)
- No (0)

End of Block: Further demographics

Start of Block: Survey metas

Objective Quale è, secondo te, il fine ultimo di questa indagine?

- Comprendere come l'informazione ed i media modficano la percezione delle istituzioni (1)
- Comprendere come la criminalità modifica la relazione tra i cittadini e lo stato (2)
- Comprendere come l'integrità delle itstituzioni italiane modifica le preferenze dei cittadini in materia di presenza statale (3)
- Misurare il livello di consapevolezza dei cittadini sulla necessità di un sistema giudiziario efficiente ed integro (4)
- Misurare il grado di reattività del tessuto sociale a fenomeni criminali (5)
- Analizzare le preferenze e nuove tendenze in materia di consumo di informazione (6)
- Comprendere come l'informazione ed i media modficano la percezione dell'interazione tra istituzioni e criminalità (7)

Page Break

Display This Question:

If Condition <= 3

trustworthyinfo In che misura ritieni che le informazioni che ti sono state fornite tramite video nel corso di questa indagine siano attendibili?

- ○ Del tutto attendibili (1)
- ○ Piuttosto attendibili (2)
- ○ Poco attendibili (3)
- ○ Del tutto inattendibili (4)

Page Break

Display This Question:

If Condition <= 3

JS

Freeform Ci hai detto che le informazioni che hai ricevuto sono **${trustworthyinfo/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}**. Potresti dirci di più sul motivo della tua risposta?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

End of Block: Survey metas

Start of Block: Debrief

Debrief Durante questa indagine potrebbero esserti state mostrate informazioni sul funzionamento delle istituzioni italiane, con particolare riferimento al sistema giudiziario, alle forze dell'ordine, ed all'integrità delle istituzioni italiane. **Queste infomazioni sono state estratte da dati reali, e rispecchiano il reale funzionamento delle istituzioni italiane:** Il numero di omicidi commessi in Italia è calato del 55% rispetto a 20 anni fa. Fonte: ISTAT Il numero di omicidi irrisolti in Italia è diminuto del 30% rispetto a 20 anni fa. Fonte: ISTAT Il numero di persone che dichiarano di essere giunti alla chiusura

di un processo amministrativo entro 1 anno dall'apertura del procedimento è raddoppiato rispetto a 10 anni fa. Fonte: ISTAT, tabelle e rapporti "Aspetti della vita quotidiana: Esperienza dei cittadini con la giustizia civile"; Ministero della Giustizia L'Italia ha guadagnato 28 posizioni (dal 43° posto) nella classifica globale di Transparency International sulla corruzione. Fonte: Transparency international

Grazie per aver partecipato! Passa alla prossima pagina per registrare le tue risposte.

End of Block: Debrief

E Follow-up survey

Breaking Negative Narratives in Low Trust Environments – Follow-up

Authors:
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Start of Block: Default Question Block

Q1 Benvenuti in questa indagine condotta da ricercatori indipendenti sulle abitudini, percezioni e preferenze da parte del pubblico su tematiche di interesse generale. La partecipazione a questo sondaggio è volontaria e puoi decidere di interromperla in qualsiasi momento senza conseguenze. Completare il questionario richiederà meno di 5 minuti. I dati raccolti saranno trattati con riservatezza, e nessuna informazione che possa identificarvi verrà registrata. Statistiche aggregate garantiranno l'anonimato. **Vi chiediamo di leggere attentamente tutte le domande e di fornire risposte sincere**. È importante dedicare il tempo necessario alla comprensione delle domande e completare il questionario per ricevere il compenso per la partecipazione. La vostra collaborazione è essenziale, e apprezziamo il tempo e l'attenzione che ci dedicherete.

- ○ Continua (1)
- ○ Esci (2)

End of Block: Default Question Block

Start of Block: Demogs

Q1 Quale è il vostro genere?

- ○ Uomo (0)
- ○ Donna (1)
- ○ Altro (3)

Q2 Quale è la vostra età?

- ○ 18-29 (1)
- ○ 30-39 (2)
- ○ 40-49 (3)
- ○ 50-59 (4)
- ○ 60-69 (5)
- ○ 70+ (6)

End of Block: Demogs

Start of Block: Obfuscation - wellbeing

JS

Q21

Quanto direste siano importanti per voi le seguenti voci? Potete rispondere indicando il grado di importanza in basso:

Mantenere un equilibrio tra vita privata e vita lavorativa (1)	
Il successo nella vita professionale (2)	
Il successo nella vita sociale (indipendentemente dalla definizione di successo in questo contesto) (3)	
Il successo nella vita familiare (indipendentemente dalla definizione di successo in questo contesto) (4)	
Il tempo libero è estremamente importante per me (5)	

Page Break

JS

Q22 Immaginate ora di essere seduti ad un bar, caffè, o ristorante, e che stiate per ordinare del cibo. Ordinate le priorità nella vostra scelta dalla più importante alla meno importante tra le seguenti voci.

	Non importante (1)	Poco importante (2)	Piuttosto importante (3)	Molto importante (4)
Origine locale degli ingredienti (1)	○	○	○	○
Stagionalità degli ingredienti (2)	○	○	○	○
Remunerazione "equitabile" dei produttori (3)	○	○	○	○
Produzione biologica o responsabile (4)	○	○	○	○
Impatto ambientale del tipo di ingrediente principale (5)	○	○	○	○

Page Break

JS

Q23 E per quanto concerne voi, ordinate i fattori più importanti nella vostra scelta, come nella domanda precendente, dalla più importante alla meno importante tra le seguenti voci.

	Non importante (1)	Poco importante (2)	Piuttosto importante (3)	Molto importante (4)
Le calorie (1)	○	○	○	○
Il gusto (6)	○	○	○	○
La tradizione (2)	○	○	○	○
L'innovazione gastronomica (4)	○	○	○	○
I benefici psicofisici degli ingredienti principali (5)	○	○	○	○

Page Break

JS

Q25 Passiamo ora alle vostre abitudini giornaliere. Pensando alla vostra giornata tipica, quanti passi stimate di fare, ogni giorno, tra le 8 del mattino e le 8 di sera? (Se non disponete di misure precise, fornite una stima)

- ○ Meno di 3000 (8)
- ○ Tra 3000 e 6000 (4)
- ○ Tra 6000 e 9000 (5)
- ○ Più di 9000 (6)
- ○ Non applicabile (7)

Page Break

JS

Q24 Quali tra le seguenti attività fisiche praticate? (Selezionate tutte le voci appropriate)

- [ ] Camminata (1)
- [ ] Nordic walking (4)
- [ ] Corsa (5)
- [ ] Palestra (fitness) (2)
- [ ] Palestra (cardio) (3)
- [ ] Yoga (6)
- [ ] Arrampicata (7)
- [ ] Ciclismo (8)
- [ ] Nuoto (9)
- [ ] Danza (10)
- [ ] Surf/Windsurf/kitesurf (11)
- [ ] Canottaggio (12)
- [ ] Lotta (karate, judo, ecc.) (13)
- [ ] ⊗ Nessuna di queste (14)

JS

Q26 Con quale frequenza (approssimativamente) praticate attività sportive?

- ○ Più di due volte a settimana (1)
- ○ Due volte a settimana (2)
- ○ Una volta a settimana (3)
- ○ Due volte al mese (4)
- ○ Una volta al mese (5)
- ○ Annualmente (6)
- ○ Mai (7)

Page Break

JS

Q27 Fumate?

- ○ Sì (1)
- ○ No (2)

Page Break

JS

Q28 Con quale frequenza consumate alcool?

- Ogni giorno (1)
- Un paio di volte a settimana (2)
- Una volta a settimana (3)
- Qualche volta al mese (4)
- Meno di una volta al mese (5)
- Mai (6)

JS

Q29 Consumate caffè, tè, o bevande contenenti caffeina?

- Sì (1)
- No (2)

Page Break

JS

Q31 Come valutereste:

il vostro stato di salute fisica (1)	☆	☆	☆	☆	☆
il vostro stato di salute mentale (4)	☆	☆	☆	☆	☆

Page Break

JS

Q32 Quante ore dormite in media al giorno

- 5 ore o meno (1)
- 6 ore (3)
- 7 ore (4)
- 8 ore (5)
- Più di 8 ore (6)

Page Break

Q47 Siete spesso a contatto con il pubblico (colleghi, clienti, richiedenti servizi, in palestra o nei negozi, ecc.)?

- Sì (praticamente tutto il tempo) (1)
- Sono a contatto con il pubblico più del 50% del tempo (3)
- Sono a contatto con il pubblico meno del 50% del tempo (4)
- No (praticamente mai) (2)

Page Break

Q49 Quanto spesso interagite con persone al di fuori della vostra cerchia familiare o di amici stretti per motivi pratici o professionali?

- Mai o quasi mai (1)
- Raramente (2)
- Sovente (3)
- Molto spesso (4)

Page Break

JS

Q36 Con quale frequenza fate ricorso ai servizi pubblici offerti dalle istituzioni italiane?

- Una volta al mese o più (1)
- Due volte l'anno (2)
- Una volta l'anno (3)
- Meno di una volta l'anno (4)

End of Block: Obfuscation - wellbeing

Start of Block: Block 3

JS

FSpriority Indicate quanto siete d'accordo con la seguente affermazione (1 stella = totalmente in disaccordo; 10 stelle = completamente d'accordo): "*Le istituzioni italiane danno priorità ai bisogni del paese nelle proprio operato*"

(1) ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

Page Break

JS

FSsatisfaction Indicate il vostro grado di soddisfazione generale con le istituzioni italiane (1 stella = totalmente insoddisfatti; 10 stelle = completamente soddisfatti):

Grado di soddisfazione (1) ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

Page Break

JS

FSchange Generalmente parlando, direste che la qualità delle istituzioni italiane è cambiata nel tempo?

- ○ Sì, in molto peggio (1)
- ○ Sì, sono un po' peggiorate (1)
- ○ No, non sono cambiate (2)
- ○ Sì, sono un po' migliorate (3)
- ○ Sì, in molto meglio (4)

Page Break

Display This Question:

If Generalmente parlando, direste che la qualità delle istituzioni italiane è cambiata nel tempo? != No, non sono cambiate

JS

FStime Ci avete detto che le istituzioni italiane "${FSchange/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}" nel tempo. Potete dirci qualcosa di più in proposito?

- Il cambiamento è avvenuto negli ultimi anni (due, massimo tre) (1)
- Il cambiamento è avvenuto negli ultimi dieci anni (2)
- Il cambiameno è avvenuto negli ultimi venti anni, a partire dall'inizio del secolo (0)
- Il cambiamento è avvenuto da molto tempo, già dagli anni 80 o prima (4)

End of Block: Block 3

Start of Block: Outcomes 2 (inst trust)

JS

FStrustnatpol Indicate il grado di fiducia che riponete nelle seguenti istituzioni (1 stella = nessuna fiducia; 10 stelle = completa fiducia) Nei politici nazionali:

(1)

JS

FStrustcompol Indicate il grado di fiducia che riponete nelle seguenti istituzioni (1 stella = nessuna fiducia; 10 stelle = completa fiducia) Nei politici comunali

(1)

JS

FStrustregpol Indicate il grado di fiducia che riponete nelle seguenti istituzioni (1 stella = nessuna fiducia; 10 stelle = completa fiducia) Nei politici regionali

(1)

JS

FStrustpolice Indicate il grado di fiducia che riponete nelle seguenti istituzioni (1 stella = nessuna fiducia; 10 stelle = completa fiducia) Nelle forze dell'ordine

(1)

JS

FStrustjustice Indicate il grado di fiducia che riponete nelle seguenti istituzioni (1 stella = nessuna fiducia; 10 stelle = completa fiducia) Nel sistema giudiziario

(1)

JS

FStrustpa Indicate il grado di fiducia che riponete nelle seguenti istituzioni (1 stella = nessuna fiducia; 10 stelle = completa fiducia) Nella pubblica amministrazione

(1)

End of Block: Outcomes 2 (inst trust)

Start of Block: Block 4

JS

Q34 Grazie mille per il vostro tempo. Il questionario è concluso e le vostre risposte saranno registrate una volta che avrete cliccato sul pulsante in basso.

End of Block: Block 4